
The State

Livraria Yendo and Japanese-Language Readers in Brazil

Governments—their laws, their policies, their borders, their sovereign territories—impacted the lives of Japanese emigrants to Brazil in countless ways, and as a result are visible not only in literary representations of those lives but also in emigrants’ reading practices themselves. For that matter, governments played a pivotal role in those communities coming into existence in the first place. The population of Japanese-language readers in Brazil did not exist solely as a result of the individual choices of autonomous actors. Thanks to a variety of political and economic forces, the community of individuals capable of reading and writing Japanese in Brazil became an unexpectedly substantial one; during the decade spanning 1924–1933 in particular, Brazil became a primary destination, receiving 63 percent of the total emigration out of the Japanese empire.¹ Today, the largest population of persons of Japanese descent outside of Japan may not be in the United States, but in Brazil.² The origins of this population, and the reasons for its size, can be traced to the beginning of the twentieth century and the different immigration policies the two countries enacted.

As mentioned previously, the notion of a “national literature” revolves around an ambiguous notion of a community that is linked by some combination of factors, including the “holy quadrinity” of state (or sometimes territory), culture, ethnos, and language.³ This chapter will address the first of these elements, which is also perhaps its most broad in possible interpretation. In addition to exploring the role of governmental forces on these immigrants and the history of this community’s first decades, the chapter will also consider the spatial aspect of the concept (more visible in its formulation as “national territory” [国土])—that is, the impact of physical proximity, or lack thereof, on reading practices. Primarily, this will take the form of an attempt to reconstruct the marketplace for literary texts

in this community, focusing on the infrastructure through which readers would have gained access to Japanese-language books, magazines, and newspapers. In so doing, it will describe the nature and scope of the literary texts, mostly produced in Tokyo, that would have been available for consumption by this community. This will show us both the remarkable degree of continuity between the texts available to readers in Japan and in Brazil, and thus the importance of thinking about this literature in relation to a community bounded by a single state (“Japan”). At the same time, given that Brazil is a distinct, sovereign, and vastly distant territory from Japan, the chapter will show how this community was profoundly affected by, and bound by, multiple polities, each of which needs to be considered in thinking about these readers. The first factor in the notion of a “national literature”—state or territory—is thus revealed to be significant but not definitive; in fact, in thinking about spatial or legal boundaries of the reading community, those of the “nation” are by turns too small, too large, or inaccurately singular.

JAPANESE-LANGUAGE READERS OUTSIDE JAPAN

The arrival of the first group of immigrants from Japan to Brazil in 1908—and thus the creation of a community of readers there—occurred against a backdrop of both ongoing emigration from Japan to, and immigration into Brazil from, a variety of countries.⁴ The migration of groups (rather than individuals), often organized and subsidized by the Japanese government, was motivated by a variety of “push” factors, among which was that government’s strategy of “peaceful expansionism” (平和的膨張) intended to extend Japan’s informal sphere of influence even as it expanded its formal empire through the acquisition of territories by force.⁵ By 1908, the Japanese government had been supporting sanctioned group migration abroad for a quarter of a century, having lifted its ban on Japanese nationals emigrating abroad in 1883.⁶ Unsanctioned group migration dated back earlier still, to the unauthorized transport of approximately two hundred individuals from Japan to Hawaii and Guam in 1868.⁷

As a result of these migration efforts, there were already communities of Japanese nationals in a number of countries around the world by the first decade of the twentieth century. The largest of these communities were in the United States and Hawaii, which the United States had annexed as a territory in 1898. Hawaii had received more than 50,000 immigrants from Japan (which opposed the annexation) by that time. Less than a decade later, in 1906, nearly 80,000 Japanese lived in the United States, roughly 60 percent of whom lived in California. With the so-called “Gentlemen’s Agreement” (日米紳士協約) of 1907, however, migration to the United States declined dramatically, falling from 15,803 in 1907 to only 3,111 in 1908.⁸ A similar agreement, negotiated in late 1907 and early 1908, established limitations on Japanese migration to Canada as well. With North

America growing increasingly hostile to immigration from Japan, migrants to the Western Hemisphere were forced to find new destinations.

Contrary to the situation in the United States, Brazil continued to look favorably on immigration; in fact, migrants from Japan were initially subsidized not by the Japanese government, but by the state of São Paulo, a powerful “pull” factor. This was in keeping with practices that had existed in Brazil as early as 1851, when the government began subsidizing migration from Europe. With the full abolition of slavery looming—it was finally outlawed in 1888—the state government of São Paulo had begun subsidizing immigrants to work in the coffee industry from 1886, drawing primarily from Italy.⁹ Migration from that country remained high from 1883 until 1902. That year, the Italian government issued the “Prinetti Decree,” which banned agents from recruiting Italian laborers in response to complaints from *colonos* (contracted plantation workers) who had not received their wages, among other mistreatment.¹⁰ As a result, the number of migrants from Italy dropped rapidly and the coffee plantation owners of São Paulo found themselves in need of a new labor force.

Planters were drawn to migrants from Japan not only as a potential source of labor, but also by a desire to increase their ties with that country, in the hope of cultivating the market there as another outlet for their coffee surplus.¹¹ In 1905, the owners formed the private São Paulo Immigration and Colonization Company (Companhia de Imigração e Colonização de São Paulo), to attract immigrants from Japan and bypass existing laws that might have impeded that process.¹² The following year, the state legislature of São Paulo changed the relevant laws, making it possible for individuals from Japan to receive subsidies as long as they met certain requirements.¹³ The Paulista coffee plantation owners were so keen to attract laborers from Japan, in fact, that they had found ways to augment the legally limited state subsidies.¹⁴ The initial agreement between Mizuno Ryō, as president of the Imperial Emigration Company (皇国殖民会社), and the São Paulo state government, signed in 1907, established a level of subvention that significantly reduced, but did not eliminate, the cost of migrating from Japan to Brazil.¹⁵ Despite these remaining costs borne by the migrants, the company was able to attract a large first contingent (though not as many as had been requested.)

The reading community in this study, then, owes its very existence to large-scale forces, including the governments of Japan and Brazil. At the same time, however, in certain cases those governmental forces functioned in conjunction with private commercial interests; in other cases the politics were not national, but local, with the state government of São Paulo being the relevant actor, rather than the Republic of Brazil. Arguably, the community owes its existence to yet another government: that of the United States. As described above, it is not accidental that group migration from Japan to Brazil began in 1908, the year after the United States demanded the conclusion of the Gentleman’s Agreement with Japan.

1908–24: THE EARLY YEARS OF THE JAPANESE
IN BRAZIL

The first group of Japanese immigrants, nearly eight hundred in number, arrived at the port town of Santos aboard the *Kasato-maru* on 18 June 1908.¹⁶ The composition of the group did not mirror the population from which it emerged. As with the migration from Japan to the United States that preceded it, the gender distribution skewed strongly towards males, with less than a quarter of the original group being female. The fact, then, that there were 165 families and only around fifty single immigrants among the 733 members of the first group requires some explanation. The São Paulo state government had contracted with the Imperial Emigration Company to bring migrants in family units, made up of at least three “adult” (over the age of twelve) members.¹⁷ The goal was to produce social stability and increase the likelihood of long-term residence in the country, in the hopes of increasing both the populations and the productivity of areas of the interior that were deemed underutilized. As a result of these incentives, many migrants formed constructed families (構成家族) for the purpose of receiving the subsidies. Despite these steps to incentivize pre-formed bonds, this first group encountered many difficulties and did not meet many of the expectations of its patrons. Nonetheless, the *Kasato-maru* immigrants—who later become an important symbol for the community—formed a foundation that facilitated the explosive growth that would follow.¹⁸ The group was also largely drawn from the island of Okinawa, with 325 of the individuals on board from that island.¹⁹

The years 1910–14 saw this initial community of immigrants grow dramatically. The second group of migrants arrived aboard the *Ryojun-maru* in 1910, having been brought by another of Mizuno’s enterprises, the Takemura Emigration Company (竹村殖民商館). This time the group, consisting of 906 migrants and three regular passengers, fared somewhat better, partially due to more favorable harvests and partially to the presence of their predecessors. Although conditions remained difficult, three-quarters were still employed on their original *fazendas* one year after arrival, a key metric of success in the eyes of the São Paulo growers and government. After this positive experience, the state contracted with both the Takemura Emigration Company and with the Oriental Emigration Company (東洋移民合資会社) to continue bringing groups of migrants. The two companies transported more than 13,000 additional contract immigrants between 1912 and 1914, bringing the total of subsidized immigrants to nearly 15,000.²⁰ The First World War brought an end to this first burst of mass migration from Japan because it led to a brief resurgence of migration from Europe, which many in Brazil considered a more desirable source. This led to the state of São Paulo eliminating its support for Japanese migration, which accordingly dropped precipitously during 1915 and 1916.²¹

It was during these early years, in 1913, that Endō Tsunehachirō (1890–1961) traveled to Brazil for the first time. Endō was twenty-three years of age when he arrived, having sailed not as a subsidized immigrant, but as a relatively rare fare-paying “regular passenger.”²² Free of any labor contract, Endō worked as a doctor’s assistant before going into business on his own; he was also able to reside in the city of São Paulo, rather than on a *fazenda* in the interior. Endō would go on to become the proprietor of what seems to have been the largest and most consequential prewar bookselling business: Endō Shoten, or Livraria Yendo.

Endō’s home prefecture of Shimane, in western Japan, shared many of the characteristics that marked the hometowns of immigrants to Brazil: spatial, economic, and social remove from the seat of governmental power in Tokyo. A small number of prefectures provided the majority of migrants to Brazil; as many as half of them came from a handful of prefectures primarily in the southwest of Japan.²³ The most common prefectures of origin during the prewar period were Okinawa, Kumamoto, Fukuoka, Hokkaidō, Fukushima, Wakayama, and Kagoshima.²⁴ Though there is no consensus about why these prefectures were so heavily represented, some have speculated that it was due in part to deliberate strategies of the Japanese government to relocate individuals who posed threats to the new Meiji state.²⁵ More commonplace factors, such as migrant networks, also help explain these statistical tendencies, but it is unlikely that their origins are entirely benign; subsequent treatment of these migrants suggests the presence of less innocent biases.²⁶

Foremost among the recipients of this discriminatory treatment were the prefectures of Kagoshima and Okinawa, which faced particular barriers during these early years. Emigration to Brazil from these prefectures was banned between 1913–16, nominally because of a higher degree of illegal documentation among their emigrants than among those from other prefectures. The ban on migration from Okinawa was reinstated between 1920–26; even after it was once again removed in 1926, the Japanese government applied special conditions to migrants from that prefecture. According to the new standards, Okinawans had to have finished their compulsory education, be under forty years of age, and be married for at least three years; they could not be adopted into their wives’ families, could not (in the case of women) have tattoos on the backs of their hands (the Ryukyuan tradition of *hajichi*), and had to understand “standard Japanese.”²⁷ The last of these is probably the most salient for this study; while Okinawans would have had linguistic practices that deviated most dramatically from state-sanctioned Japanese, each of these prefectures-of-origin possessed a dialect that differed notably from the Tokyo dialect, which had only recently been elevated to the status of the official national dialect.

It is often thought that the common element among all of these source prefectures, and thus the sole driving force behind individuals’ desire to migrate, was

economic distress. Economics clearly played a role in many individuals' decisions to migrate, yet while it is often thought that Japanese emigrants to Brazil left out of desperation, this was not always the case. Apparently 86 percent of the migrants who arrived between 1908 and 1922 had belonged to the landed farmers' class in Japan. Moreover, whatever their stations had been in Japan, many were able to leave their *colono* status fairly quickly and become *sitiantes*, or landed farmers, in Brazil.²⁸ *Colonos* were paid for the work they did tending the plantations' coffee trees; they were also allowed to grow other crops between the rows of trees for their own use. Over time, some were able to amass sufficient capital to transition from working as a *colono* to sharecropping, contract farming, or lease farming, in the hope of eventually becoming owners of their own farms.²⁹ The first of these Japanese landowners in Brazil were the handful of families who settled the Brazilian-government-planned Monson Daiichi Shokuminchi, near the Cerqueira César station on the Sorocabana train line.³⁰

That is not to say that prospective migrants were not motivated by the availability of subsidies. After having been suspended in 1914, subsidies from the state of São Paulo resumed again in 1917 (when European immigration dropped as a result of World War I) and remained generally available until around 1921, as well as available on a limited basis, funded by private plantation owners, until as late as 1925.³¹ The subsidies provided financial incentives, but the actual recruitment, transportation, and other logistics of migration were still facilitated by private Japanese migration companies. These early years saw a number of companies form and disband; though they worked in close coordination with both governments, these companies were run by private individuals like Mizuno Ryō, who had founded the first two migration companies that brought groups to Brazil. After the Takemura Emigration Company was liquidated, Mizuno formed the South American Colonization Company (南米植民株式会社); he was also involved in the merger of the Oriental Emigration Company and the Morioka Emigration Company (盛岡移民合名会社) to form the Brazilian Emigration Society (ブラジル移民組合) in 1916.³² This movement toward consolidation of the emigration companies continued until 1920, when all of them had been merged into the Overseas Development Company (海外興業株式会社, Kaigai Kōgyō Kabushiki Kaisha, also known as the KKKK).³³

When the subsidies from Brazil resumed on 30 June 1917, some 18,259 Japanese (*honpōjin*, 本邦人) were in Brazil; the stark gender disparity continued to exist, with 16,805 men and only 1,454 women.³⁴ With migration more stably subsidized by the Overseas Development Company, the community grew dramatically: more than 12,000 new migrants arrived between 1917 and 1919. From 1920, however, migration to Brazil from Japan dropped again, and remained low (around one thousand per year) until 1924. It was in response to this drop in 1920 that the Japanese government began providing some financial assistance to migrants; it gradually increased its direct and indirect assistance until 1924, when a decision

was made to attempt to cover the full cost of emigrants' passage to Brazil.³⁵ The historian Nobuya Tsuchida identifies three factors that led to this decision: the domestic instability produced by the Great Kantō Earthquake of 1923, the realization that the São Paulo government would likely no longer subsidize migration from Japan, and the more-or-less complete closing of the United States to Japanese migration with the Immigration Act of 1924 (which included the Asian Exclusion Act.)³⁶ As a result of these developments, the population of Japanese in Brazil had more than doubled by 1924. According to Japanese statistics, 41,774 individuals from the inner territories of Japan (内地人) were in Brazil as of 30 June 1924.³⁷ More specifically, the vast majority lived in the interior of the state of São Paulo, often together in communities of various sizes. This period saw the creation of a number of Japanese colonies, which provided environments that many immigrants from Japan found particularly desirable.³⁸

Ethnic enclaves were not a new phenomenon in Brazil. *Núcleos coloniais* pre-dated Japanese migration to Brazil, beginning in the early- to mid-nineteenth century. One example was Nova Odessa, a community of Russian immigrants created in 1905 for agricultural laborers.³⁹ Plans began to be created for similar Japanese colonies as early as 1908, when a group of politicians, businessmen, and farmers created the Tokyo Syndicate (東京シンジケート) for that purpose. This led to the creation of the Katsura, Sete Barras, and Registro Colonies in Iguape, on the coast southwest of Santos.⁴⁰ The state government provided the land, created roads, subsidized passage, and exempted the Syndicate from taxes for a period of five years; in exchange, the Syndicate agreed to populate the colony.⁴¹ Once the agreement was in place, the Brazilian Colonization Company (ブラジル拓殖株式会社) was founded in 1913 to oversee the actual creation of the colonies.⁴² By 1916, Katsura and Registro were established and running successfully. The merger of the Brazilian Colonization Company and the KKKK in 1919 made the 1920 construction of Sete Barras even easier. Together, these three colonies, which were connected by newly constructed roads not only to one another but also to ports on the Ribeira river and to other nearby towns, came to be known jointly as the Iguape Colony. By the end of 1924, more than 2,500 individuals lived in these three colonies alone, which were focused more on the production of rice than of coffee.⁴³

In the years that followed these early colonies did decline, but they had set the stage for similar experiments elsewhere in Brazil. From the mid-1920s, after the early experiments with the Iguape Colony, the Japanese government focused its energies on establishing similar colonies in other areas, primarily in the interior of the state of São Paulo. The Japanese colonies took five different forms: spontaneous colonies (such as the community in Mogi das Cruzes); interior colonies built on newly opened lands, with lots sold individually (such as the Hirano Colony); colonies created by private Japanese capital (such as Bastos); communities of cotton farmers who rented land along key train lines; and colonies set up

by the federal or state governments (such as the Monson colonies).⁴⁴ Living in these colonies, Japanese emigrants came into less contact with non-Japanese than one might imagine, limited in some cases to day laborers, landowners, and merchants in neighboring towns.⁴⁵ This particular collective formation likely exacerbated existing anti-Japanese sentiment, which, though not as strong or as prevalent as in the United States, had existed for some time.⁴⁶ Other likely effects were the strengthening of ethnic identification and the inhibition of Portuguese language acquisition.

In both these formal enclaves and other communities, even of smaller size, civil organizations reinforced that identification by linking Japanese immigrants not only with one another but also with the Japanese government. Japanese Associations (日本人会), as well as Young Men's and Women's Associations (青年会), soon began to emerge wherever any significant number of families settled in the same area; these associations took on many of the functions of self-governance in these colonies.⁴⁷ Among the projects they undertook were community hygiene, road and bridge maintenance, youth education (including constructing schools), establishing communal facilities for different industries, and developing transportation systems. In some cases, the groups would handle the Japanese family registries (戸籍) for the area, and occasionally even the mail service. While not invested with any authority by the Brazilian government, these organizations did have some forms of internal power, up to and including the ability to "exile" individuals who did not adhere to their rules by posting notices of exclusion (除名広告) in the Japanese-language newspapers.

The Associations also played an important role in expanding the Japanese-language reading community in Brazil. Such groups would often not only operate evening and weekend schools, but also purchased magazines that would be circulated among their members.⁴⁸ While likely exaggerated, it is worth noting that an article from 1921 suggested that a given copy of a magazine might be read by dozens of, and in some cases as many as one hundred, different people.⁴⁹ This sort of sharing of texts speaks to the demand for Japanese-language reading material among the immigrants, who enjoyed a high level of literacy. Of the individuals who arrived aboard the *Kasato-maru* in 1908, 532 (68 percent) of the 781 were recorded as literate, and it has been estimated that fewer than 10 percent of the remaining 249 were completely illiterate.⁵⁰

Needless to say, it was not only through the sort of associations described above that individuals gained access to print culture. In addition to all of the informal avenues that would have been available to them—bringing books and magazines from Japan, trading and lending them between friends and family, etc.—a commercial marketplace for Japanese-language print culture also emerged during these early years. As will be discussed in greater length in the next chapter, locally produced Japanese-language newspapers appeared with the launch of the *Nanbei shūhō* (南米週報) in 1915 and the *Nippaku shinbun* (日伯新聞) the

following year.⁵¹ The Japanese-language weekly *Burajiru jihō*, which would go on to be the central (though not always the largest) newspaper during the prewar period, was launched in 1917 on the Taishō emperor's birthday, August 31. Not only did these newspapers carry fiction themselves, as will be discussed, but they also carried advertisements for retailers; three of these that emerged during this early period—all general trading companies that dealt with printed matter—warrant specific mention.

One of the earliest ads that explicitly mentioned books, for a general store named Kidō Shōkai (木藤商会) located in the city of São Paulo, appeared in early 1918. The company had been founded by Kidō Isoemon, who had come to Brazil from the South Pacific. His company advertised in the pages of the *Burajiru jihō* from the time the newspaper was founded, describing how it changed money and sold Japanese non-prescription medicines, carpenter's tools, Tosa-style saws, and Japanese seeds, among other things. Those advertisements reveal that during these early years, along with these other essential items, books—and dictionaries in particular—were of great importance to the immigrants. On 1 February 1918, for example, Kidō advertised two English-Japanese dictionaries attributed to Inoue (Inouye) Jūkichi.

Some of the books listed had an obvious functional value for the new immigrants. Along with a book on Western cooking, the advertisement also listed the most popular Japanese-Portuguese reference available at the time, Kanazawa Ichirō's *Portuguese (Brazilian) Conversation (Conversação Portuguez-Japoneza, ぼるとがる (ぶらじる) 語会話)*. At the same time, though, not all the books on offer were so practical. The advertisement also stated that the store had a stock of over five hundred *kōdan* (講談) titles; these were nominally transcriptions of orally performed storytelling. We might note that Kidō felt it was necessary to clarify that these *kōdan* were bound, suggesting that they may have been circulating in unbound form as well. Beyond *kōdan*, Kidō also apparently had more than five hundred titles in the genres of literary works (文芸作品) and self-improvement manuals (修養書), as well as a selection of songbooks (歌本). The quantity of the stock described suggests that while this might be the first time Kidō advertised books, it may have been *carrying* them for some time. One month later, on 8 March 1918, Kidō offered to buy used books and noted that books were available to be lent, again reminding us that books were already circulating through the community prior to the appearance of these advertisements. The 18 March advertisement also listed a complete set of the official primary school textbooks approved by the Japanese government.

A competitor appeared a year and a half later. Segi Yosoitsu announced the opening of his store at 49 Rua Conde de Sarzedas, Segi Shōten, on 31 August 1919; his stock included cosmetics, foodstuffs, medicines, seeds, tools, and books (書籍). On 5 December 1919, Segi listed the “new” October magazine issues that had arrived at the store (and their respective prices, here in *réis*, inclusive of

shipping), including: *Taiyō* (2,500), *Chūō kōron* (3,500), *Waseda bungaku* (3,600), *Bungei kurabu* (2,300), and *Fujin no tomo* (1,500). By comparison, the October *Taiyō* had sold in Japan for 50 *sen*, *Chūō kōron* for 75 *sen*, *Waseda bungaku* for 80 *sen*, *Bungei kurabu* for 45 *sen*, and *Fujin no tomo* for 30 *sen*. It noted that supplies of each issue were limited.⁵² The advertisement makes it clear that Segi had entered the distribution business of Japanese newspapers and magazines, but it was not exclusively a bookseller; the advertisement also listed the non-print goods the store continued to carry. A 16 April 1920 advertisement shows that Segi also stocked some newspapers, including the *Ōsaka Mainichi shinbun* (300 *réis*, shipping included), *Taishō nichinichi shinbun* (250 *réis*), *Yorozu chōhō* (200 *réis*), and *Hōchi shinbun* (200 *réis*). Looking at a related marketplace, Hibi Yoshitaka has written about advertisements that reveal that a vast selection of newspapers from throughout the Japanese empire was available to consumers living in California as early as 1913.⁵³ Just as in California, such newspapers were available to Brazilian retailers, including Segi, through the large central distributors in Tokyo, such as Tōkyōdō.

The last of the three retail competitors in the bookselling business was Nakaya Shōten, which began as Nippaku Bussan Benri-gumi. Despite advertising the opening of his store on 13 February 1920, Nakaya Kumatarō had already been in business for many years. At the time that the store opening was announced, the company did not list printed matter as one of the products it handled. But by at least 11 March 1921, the company was listing fiction (小説) alongside the other non-print goods it carried; by 15 April 1921, the number of literary genres offered had increased to include *kōdan*, popular song collections, and *Naniwa bushi* (a genre of sung narrative). The company announced its new name on 10 June 1921. Kidō, Nakaya, and Segi were in direct competition, and that competition could be fierce; in at least one case, the retailers even turned to the legal system for a resolution. On 5 August 1921, both Segi and Nakaya took out ads, which appeared side by side (and contained identical text), saying that a lawsuit had been brought against them by Kidō for carrying goods falsely labeled with counterfeit trademarks, but that the lawsuit had been thrown out as groundless by the Brazilian courts.

The company that produced the *Burajiru jihō* newspaper where the three retailers advertised also joined this emerging marketplace itself.⁵⁴ On 16 July 1920, *Burajiru Jihōsha* announced its entrance into the business with an appeal to the life of the mind:

In the modern world, what is it that distinguishes human superiority from inferiority? Is it skin color? Is it physical strength? Is it eloquence? No! No! No! It is nothing less than a well-founded intellect.

The company then laid out the procedure by which customers could order magazines and books from Japan through them. Magazine prices would be 2.5 times the Japanese retail price, converted to *mil réis*; the example given was for a 25-sen magazine, which would be 1.25 *mil réis*. Customers would then pay for a full year in advance (the cost of special issues would be drawn from this prepayment and settled biannually.) Book prices would (in most cases) be calculated similarly; the example here was for a two-yen book, which would be 15 *mil réis*. The company would cover customs and shipping costs, including delivery to the customer. The resultant journal prices were slightly higher than those of its competitor, Segi; *Taiyō*, for example, would have sold for 3 *mil réis* (given the 60-sen price listed in Burajiru Jihōsha's 6 August 1920 advertisement), as compared to the 2.5 *mil réis* price at Segi.

As early as 20 December 1918, Burajiru Jihōsha also advertised one of the most important dictionaries in the Japanese-speaking community in Brazil prior to the Second World War: Ōtake Wasaburō's Portuguese-Japanese dictionary. Demand must have existed through the state, since the advertisements soon listed local agents to contact in the colonies of Iguape and Ribeirão. It sold well enough that on 13 October 1920, Burajiru Jihōsha ran an ad to inform potential buyers that the dictionary was currently sold out, but that it would run another notification as soon as a new shipment had arrived. By 13 May 1921, a new shipment of the "long-awaited" dictionaries is announced, though now at the price of 12 *mil réis* (plus 1 *mil réis* for shipping.)

During these early years, Endō Tsunehachirō ran a relatively small but ambitious operation. In 1917, his wife and (at that time) two children joined him in the city of São Paulo, where he seems to have been primarily focused on selling soy sauce. The first number of *Burajiru jihō*, dated 31 August 1917, contained two separate advertisements from Endō. One (on page 11) listed Endō as the retailer for "the cheapest and most delicious soy sauce made in Brazil," Marunishi; another (on page 5) notes that even as Endō was the "sole retailer" of Marunishi soy sauce, he was also engaged in the sale of sundries (雜貨). In this advertisement he mentioned that he had recently begun making sale trips to the city of Bauru and requested the patronage of the many fine individuals living along the railroad line(s). The small scale of his operation is suggested through his request that correspondence directed at him from Bauru be sent care of (a.c., *ao cuidado de*) the Hotel Japonez, at No. 8, Rua Batista de Carvalho. Finally, an announcement (also on page 5) from the newspaper listed Endō as being in charge of subscriptions for all readers outside of the city.

Things were developing rapidly for Endō, though. Two weeks later, in the 14 September 1917 issue of the newspaper, Endō advertised that he had relocated from No. 85, Conde Sarzedas, to No. 65 of the same street. He ran variants of these ads in nearly every issue of the newspaper (save for 26 October 1917) until 16 November




FIGURE 1. Advertisements for Endō Tsunehachirō, *Burajiru jihō*, 31 August 1917. Courtesy of the Hoji Shinbun Digital Collection

1917, when he announced that sales trips were now being made to Ribeirão Preto.⁵⁵ On 19 April 1918, Endō announced that his representative was now making sales trips along the Araraquara railway line, which ran into the interior in the north-west of the state. By 2 August 1918, Endō had extended his region along the Sorocabana line. By 7 September, he was covering the Mogiana line as well.

On 13 August 1920, Endō Shōten announced that it had opened a store in Birigui, roughly 500 kilometers from São Paulo.⁵⁶ The items advertised show the extent to which Endō's operation had grown: in addition to carrying candy and medicine, and to handling pesticide sprayers, mail, and official documents for the consulate and the Imin Kumiai (Cooperativa de Emigração para o Brasil), the store would lend books. We should note, however, that the address of the store was not given. Instead, the ad listed a *caixa postal* (post office box) at the Birigui train station. While it may well have been the case that Birigui was small enough at the time that one could find the store with little difficulty, the choice of address reveals that most of Endō's business would still be occurring via postal contact, followed by visits from traveling salemen (*viajantes*) representing Endō.

On 31 August 1923, Endō advertised as the owner of Endō Shōten, giving its address as Rua Bonita, 9, in Liberdade.⁵⁷ He explained that up until that point there had not been sufficient supply of “fancy goods” (小間物) to satisfy “the gentlewomen and young ladies in the countryside”; to remedy that, Endō had recently returned to Japan, where he had acquired a large stock. He encouraged individuals coming into the city and individuals who “wish to return briefly” (that is, to feel as though they have returned) to Japan to come visit his store. The store now had a large stock of books, including works by such authors as Kuroiwa Ruikō, Kagawa Toyohiko, Satō Kōroku, Kikuchi Yūhō, Nagata Mikihiko, Murakami Namiroku, and Tokutomi Kenjirō (Rōka). Needless to say, the store still carried a diverse range of products, including Italian-made pesticide sprayers (噴霧器).⁵⁸

Endō did not stay at the Rua Bonita location for long; on 7 September 1923 he announced that Endō Shōten had moved to Rua Conde de Sarzedas, 23.⁵⁹ But the walk-in business in these storefronts in the city of São Paulo was likely




FIGURE 2. Réis per yen exchange rate, 1918–40.

not the center of the company's bookselling operation. At least as early as 13 June 1924, Endō Shōten began to list the titles and prices of books that it advertised as newly arrived, using the advertisement space as a form of catalog.⁶⁰ While this first catalog only listed fifteen titles, they soon grew in size. A 19 December 1924 advertisement, for example, listed over one hundred "newly arrived" titles; it also mentioned that the store had replenished its lending stock with new titles.⁶¹ Prices in these advertisements (and those from the other companies mentioned above) often listed shipping costs or explicitly noted that prices included shipping, suggesting that the company did a lot of business by mail, sending printed matter out to the various colonies that were appearing in the interior of the state and beyond.

The prices in these advertisements show limited fluctuation, for the most part. One of the reasons for this is that the prewar period saw a reasonably stable exchange rate between the *real* and the yen, with one exception. The graph below shows the exchange rate from September 1917 through December 1940.⁶² What is apparent is that between 1917 and 1921, the yen rose in relative value, from a starting level of 1900 réis to the level it would sustain for most of the period, between 4,000–5,000 réis. The most dramatic exception is the period beginning in the autumn of 1930, when the yen began a steady climb that peaked at 7753 in October 1931, only to then fall to 2579 a little more than a year later. This period of dramatic fluctuation coincided not only with the Great Depression, but also with Vargas's seizure of power in October 1930. The exchange rate returned to its previous stable level late in 1934 and remained there for the rest of the prewar period.

The marketplace for Japanese print in Brazil developed with such speed despite two of the factors that had been so pivotal for the rapid expansion of the retail market in Japan around the same time: fixed retail prices (定価) and the consignment (委託) system.⁶³ The fixed retail price system, established around 1920 in Japan by industry organizations such as the National League of Book Associations (全国書籍商組合連合会), minimized competition between bookstores and sustained price levels, allowing for more profitability. When shipping costs

to markets in Asia, and to Japan's formal colonies there in particular, made these fixed prices detrimental to the colonial marketplaces, local fixed prices were established from as early as 1922 (with the creation of a set price in Taiwan [台湾売価]), and a general outer-territories fixed price (外地定価) was established in 1938.⁶⁴ The Japanese-language booksellers in Brazil seem not to have achieved a level of cooperation that allowed the establishment of fixed prices there. Similarly, the consignment system that facilitated dramatic growth in retail stores in Japan could not, in practice, extend to Brazil because of shipping and tariff costs that made returns impractical. As a result, the bookstores there remained under a de facto final purchase (買い切り) system. Despite the absence of these advantages, which had led to an increase from three thousand retail booksellers in Japan in 1912 to more than ten thousand by 1927, the marketplace in Brazil still saw significant growth.

Alongside this developing commercial market, there were also non-commercial efforts to disseminate Japanese-language texts throughout the various colonies in Brazil and beyond. One of the first and most visible of these efforts was led by the Rikkōkai (力行会), a group founded in Japan in 1897.⁶⁵ Nagata Shigeshi, the leader of the organization at the time, spent most of 1920 traveling through North and South America to see the conditions of Japanese emigrants to those countries. After his trip, he described his greatest source of distress as being the realization that there were so few Japanese-language books and magazines available to them.⁶⁶ He subsequently made a series of proposals for steps to improve the lives of fellow Japanese abroad using printed matter.⁶⁷

His first plan was to establish overseas libraries, an idea he presented to the Foreign Ministry in February 1921.⁶⁸ The Ministry provided support from its private discretionary budget (機密費) and then donations were received from a variety of sources amounting to a total of 1000 yen. Moriya Hokichi, another Rikkōkai member, traveled around Japan collecting donations of books, and the organization's journal, *Rikkō sekai*, called for donations both of books and cash. In the end, Moriya had collected more than ten thousand volumes.⁶⁹ Roughly half of these he sent to countries including Mexico, Cuba, Panama, Peru, Chile, and Argentina. The other half he took to Brazil. An article in the *Burajiru jihō* in December 1921 announced that they had cleared customs.⁷⁰ Although the original plan was to send a box of books to migrant communities and then have representatives there circulate them, it was later decided to do otherwise. Instead, they were lent to Japanese Associations and youth groups (described earlier) for a term, with those groups making them available to people in their areas. The article reports that 110 requests were received from all over the country. Although the books were free to groups deemed suitable, shipping costs were to be covered by the recipient. Some of the recipients said that they had not held a book since arriving in Brazil years earlier; it was as if, the article states, they had been "starving for books."

1924–34: THE YEARS OF JAPANESE
STATE-SPONSORED MIGRATION

While the Japanese government had played a role in initiating and sustaining migration to Brazil from the beginning, in the early years the bulk of the administration was done by private emigration companies and most of the financial assistance came from Brazil. By no later than August 1922, however, the Japanese Home Ministry had already begun to work on measures by which it could more directly encourage migration to Brazil in order to prompt a significant increase in the number of people going abroad. In terms of direct support to migrants, one of the earliest forms this took was a 200-yen subvention per individual to those who had been affected by the Great Kantō Earthquake of 1923; the government began making this aid available in February 1924. By July of that year, funds had been allocated to cover the complete relocation expenses for some three thousand emigrants. The number of recipients was expanded to five thousand in 1926 and 7,750 in 1927. With steps such as these, the source of economic incentives shifted from the São Paulo state government to the Japanese government, and the period of (Japanese) state-sponsored migration (国策移民) had begun.

Various subsequent crises in the Japanese (and global) economies, beginning in 1927, incentivized the Japanese government to increase further its support for migration to Brazil, in the hopes of removing a portion of its excess labor force while providing other secondary economic benefits for Japan, including remittances from emigrants, trade with Brazil as a result of their presence, and stimulus for the shipping industry. In addition to direct financial subsidization, governmental support took other forms as well, including the creation of the Kobe Immigrants Assembly Center (国立移民収容所) in 1928. In June, 1929, the Japanese government created the Ministry of Overseas Affairs (拓務省) to oversee emigration and colonization beyond the main islands.⁷¹ Governmental initiatives were not only occurring at the national level. The 1927 Overseas Emigration Cooperatives Act (or Emigration Cooperative Societies Law; 海外移住組合法) had enabled the creation of prefectural emigration cooperative societies to recruit and support emigrants to Brazil; by the mid-1930s, nearly every prefecture had such a society.⁷²

These local activities were not operating in isolation. In 1927 the Overseas Emigration Cooperatives Federation (海外移住組合連合会) was formed to link these prefectural organizations together. By 1929, the Federation had purchased more than 500,000 acres of land in the states of São Paulo and Paraná. In March of that year it also established a subsidiary company in Brazil, the Sociedade Colonizadora do Brasil Limitada (ブラジル拓植組合 in Japanese, often shortened to “Bratac”), to oversee the founding of colonies, the managing of their lands, and the introduction of colonists. The company operated the Bastos, Tieté, Nova Aliança, and Três Barras (Paraná) colonies.⁷³ The company first acquired land, then sold

it either to newly arrived immigrants or to immigrants already in Brazil (though the conditions of the sale changed depending on the category.) In the case of Bastos, ten-*alqueire* (roughly sixty-acre) lots cost 1,440 yen (or 7 *contos*, if bought by someone already in Brazil), though payment could be deferred until the fourth year of occupancy. They also needed to possess a significant amount of capital: 1,600 yen, if arriving from Japan. In 1930, one *conto*, or one-thousand *mil réis*, was worth 240 yen; at the time, a primary school teacher in Japan earned roughly 45 yen per month.⁷⁴ When fewer families than expected moved to Bastos, Bratac began providing incentives that proved quite successful in attracting families, not only from Japan, but also from within Brazil itself. Bratac also provided significant infrastructure for these colonies. In addition to experimental farms to grow crops other than coffee (including cotton, wheat, and tobacco), it built roads, offices, dormitories, hotels, stores, clinics, schools, power plants, mills, and other facilities that would be used in common by the colonists.⁷⁵

While most Japanese immigrants lived in the states of São Paulo or Paraná, there were population clusters elsewhere as well. One example is the Acará Colony, with Tomé-Açu at its center, in the state of Pará in the far north of Brazil. This colony was run not by Bratac or the Overseas Development Company, but by the private South American Colonization Company (南米拓殖株式会社), founded in 1928, and its Brazilian subsidiary, the Companhia Nippônica de Plantação do Brazil S.A., founded in 1929. Some 1400 miles away from the city of São Paulo, this colony was built with facilities similar to those provided by Bratac to its colonies. This colony was not as successful in the prewar period as many of the other colonies, however, for a variety of reasons. First among these was the prevalence of malaria, which had largely been brought under control in the colonies farther to the south; this was compounded by other problems related to growing conditions, transportation, and nearby market demand.⁷⁶ In 1935 the company behind the colony turned over most of its operations to the colonists, the number of which steadily dwindled as people left for São Paulo or the nearby city of Belém.

While coffee production had driven migration from Japan, it proved to be an unstable foundation for building a sizable and enduring community in Brazil. Coffee prices fluctuated dramatically, leading the Japanese government to take dramatic steps in order to shore up the commodity price.⁷⁷ This price instability was particularly marked after the start of the Great Depression in 1929, when the price of a bag of unprocessed coffee beans dropped from 70 *mil réis* in 1928 to 8 *mil réis* in 1930. Needless to say, these devaluations were of great concern to the Brazilian government as well. In 1931, the new Vargas regime announced its plan to buy up and destroy excess coffee supplies in an effort to curb this commodity price collapse.⁷⁸ This was followed by a three-year ban on the planting of new coffee trees, announced in November 1932. The uncertainty that attended coffee prices led increasing numbers of immigrants to switch to other crops. One of the

most important of these was cotton. In 1912, 92.6 percent of Japanese in Brazil were involved in coffee production, while only 1.2 percent were involved in cotton and 2.5 percent in rice; by 1937, cotton had surpassed coffee, with 32.1 percent of immigrants producing coffee, 39 percent growing cotton, and 6 percent cultivating rice.⁷⁹

Notwithstanding this instability, immigration to Brazil from Japan increased dramatically over the decade of Japanese state-sponsored migration. 1924 saw more than four times as many immigrants from Japan as 1923 (from roughly eight hundred to roughly 3,700); this number continued to climb rapidly year after year until 1929, when more than fifteen thousand individuals undertook the journey. Many of these immigrants settled in or near the state of São Paulo.⁸⁰ In 1927, more than sixty-five thousand Japanese lived in and around the cities of São Paulo (21,303), Bauru (19,771), Riberão Preto (17,421), Santos (6,272), and Rio de Janeiro (314).⁸¹ By October 1929, when the stock market crashed in the United States, the population of Japanese (邦人) in Brazil topped one hundred thousand.⁸² Starting in 1932, the Japanese government offered ¥50 for each adult emigrant, further reducing economic barriers to migration.⁸³ In 1933, when Minister of Overseas Affairs Nagai Ryūtarō was asked in the House of Peers about the total amount of governmental support emigrants were receiving, he stated that each emigrant family was being subsidized (in various forms, both direct and indirect) on average ¥1,340.⁸⁴ The number of Japanese emigrating to Brazil rose to such an extent that Japan became the leading source of immigrants to Brazil during the years 1932–35.⁸⁵ According to statistics from the Japanese government, on 1 October 1935 a total of 116,502 Japanese (邦人) lived in Brazil; by this time the genders had come to be more equally represented, with 64,221 men and 52,281 women.⁸⁶ A full one-third of all the prewar immigrants from Japan arrived during the years 1930–35; in 1933, immigrants from Japan made up more than half of all those who came to Brazil.⁸⁷

Even as the 1920s were a period of rapid and dramatic expansion of the immigrant communities from Japan, they were also a period in which a discourse emerged among the immigrants about the future of those communities. Was it appropriate for the presumption to be that the communities were transitory, with their members always looking toward a return to Japan (even if that return only happened for a small fraction of migrants), or should they begin thinking about settling permanently in Brazil? To give a sense of how powerful the expectation of eventually returning to Japan was (regardless of the reality), a 1937 survey of twelve thousand individuals living along the Noroeste line in São Paulo revealed that 85 percent intended to return to Japan eventually, 10 percent intended to stay permanently, and 5 percent were unsure.⁸⁸ This expectation often failed to be realized, as the circumstances in Brazil made it more difficult to amass any savings than it had been for earlier migrants to the United States; only around 10 percent of Japanese immigrants to Brazil ever did return.⁸⁹

Central to this discussion (for individuals on both sides of the debate) was the education of the youngest members of the colony's population. For those who planned to return or who wanted to strengthen the linguistic competence (and thus coherence) of the ethnic population in Brazil, making sure the new generation was fluent in Japanese was essential. The first Japanese-language school, the Taishō Shōgakkō, was built in the Liberdade neighborhood of São Paulo in July 1915. By April 1932, there were a total of 187 such schools in the states of São Paulo, Paraná, and Mato Grosso, with over nine thousand students.⁹⁰ There were forces that worked against this process, however. In April 1933 new restrictions were promulgated by the Brazilian government that impacted this Japanese-language education. Not only did it become illegal to teach children ten years of age or younger a foreign language, but also teachers had to have passed Brazilian certification examinations, foreign language textbooks required approval by the Brazilian government, and textbooks that were deemed to impact negatively the development of Brazilian nationalist sentiment were banned. In 1938, the first of these rules was extended to include children fourteen and under.⁹¹ On 25 December 1938, foreign language schools (primarily Japanese, Italian, and German) were all ordered closed.

These developments in language policy occurred against a backdrop of persistent (though not monolithic) concern about the relatively isolated colonies of Japanese immigrants, which some perceived as fundamentally unassimilable.⁹² At the same time, there were moderate voices that rose in defense of the colonies: some argued for greater racial tolerance, and specifically cited the Japanese as "orderly, intelligent, and industrious." Surveys done in the mid-1920s of large plantations were cited to show that farm owners considered their Japanese employees to be "very sober, honest, orderly, and, above all, industrious without comparison." While the concerned parties never gained enough power to effect significant policy changes against these colonies, the fears persisted in many quarters. Despite the obvious contributions of these colonies to the Brazilian economy, by the mid-1930s their "social and physical isolation from the dominant society," compounded by "Japan's aggressive expansionist policy in Asia," led many to grow suspicious of them, and some to refer to them as "social cysts" (*quistos sociais*).⁹³

This perception of the Japanese colonies as isolated was partially a result of their geographical remove, but was also due to their relative ethnic homogeneity, the involvement of the Japanese government in their development, and the extent of Japanese language use within them.⁹⁴ This was not merely a matter of perception within larger political struggles; it was also a source of various difficulties in daily life. The constant advertising of dictionaries and other language-learning texts speaks to these challenges. Significant language barriers existed between the first-generation immigrants and the Portuguese-speaking population, though this was somewhat mitigated not only as second-generation Portuguese-speaking children grew older, but also through interpreters who were often dispatched to

the colonies. In May 1932, the Japanese Consulate General provided funds for the creation of an Agricultural Interpreters Association (耕地通訳協会, Associação dos Intérpretes), which originally had twenty-eight members but had grown to seventy-six by the end of that year.⁹⁵

These problems aside, the intensive use of Japanese among so many of the individuals in this community caused the demand for Japanese-language texts to explode during these years of dramatic population growth. The growth led both to quantitative expansion of the market for texts, and qualitative changes in the nature of that market. For example, a 1926 advertisement for Endō suggests a number of ways in which its business was expanding. An announcement that Endō had formed a traveling reading group (巡回読書会) for its customers in the interior revealed that many of the company's customers remained far from its retail store.⁹⁶ The advertisement also mentioned that Endō carried back numbers (月遅れ) of magazines.⁹⁷ Many magazines from Japan were also available from at least 1919, when *Taiyō*, *Chūō kōron*, *Waseda bungaku*, *Shinshōsetsu*, *Bungei kurabu* and other titles were advertised.⁹⁸ Despite the distance separating the two countries, magazines arrived in Brazil not long after their cover publication date: according to one advertisement, July issues of magazines such as *Kingu* had arrived at member stores by July 10.⁹⁹ When newer issues arrived, the unsold stock from previous months was made available at reduced prices; the frequency of advertisements listing such titles reveals that demand remained high for periodicals even when their characteristic timeliness was diminished.

Another telling element of the April 1926 advertisement for Endō is its announcement of the “restocking” (再着) of a number of books, mostly concerning child-raising and hygiene, which presumably had attracted more interest than the original supply could meet. The booklists that appear in the advertisements of Endō and other booksellers do not reveal the quantities that were available; the possibility exists that in many cases only one copy of each book was purchased. It does seem, however, that the lists present newly arrived books, rather than the store's entire stock; a large, half-page advertisement on 4 April 1934, for example, listed titles specifically as “Newly Arrived Books.”¹⁰⁰ Though the precise size of the market is unclear, what we do observe is Endō's increasing ability to sustain itself on that market alone. By 1928 Endō was representing itself as “specializing in books,” despite its continuing to advertise other goods.¹⁰¹ Although most of its sales likely continued to be made by mail, a series of moves suggests that the walk-in trade was also growing. On 30 August 1928, Endō Shōten announced that it was moving to a new location at Rua Conselheiro Furtado, 8.¹⁰² Finally, in 1932, Endō changed the name of the company slightly but significantly from *shōten* (商店, general store) to *shoten* (書店, bookstore).¹⁰³

We have some sense of the titles available in Brazil during these first decades, thanks to these advertisements that listed specific stock.¹⁰⁴ They suggest a dramatically increasing selection, as these mini-catalogs grow from lists of fifteen titles in

Bismarck), and treatises on Japanese expansion (『膨張の日本』). Works by Kikuchi Kan appeared over the longest span of time, from 1924 until 1940. By contrast, Naoki Sanjūgo's works appeared in a clump soon after his death on 24 February 1934. That is not to say that more unusual books did not appear as well. One example might be the work of the half-Russian, half-Japanese author Ōizumi Kokuseki (1894–1957), one of which appeared as early as 1924.

We also have some insight into one sample population and its consumption of print. In 1939, an almanac produced by the publisher of the *Nippaku shinbun* included a survey of reading habits of the approximately 11,500 households located in the Bauru region, along two major train lines (Noroeste and Paulista) in São Paulo. These households would have been almost exclusively rural and engaged in agriculture, as the region does not include the city of São Paulo. The survey found that of these households, 1,078 purchased “children’s magazines,” 1,908 purchased “women’s magazines,” 5,967 purchased “men’s magazines,” and 10,154 purchased newspapers.¹⁰⁸ Nearly every household, that is, purchased a newspaper. The survey notes, however, that it was very unusual for families to read newspapers from Japan; the vast majority were published in Brazil.

We have a little more detailed information about magazines. In 1935, when the total number of migrants to Brazil had surpassed 170,000, a single newspaper article gives us a glimpse into the magnitude of that market.¹⁰⁹ According to that article, August 1935 marked the first month in which more than ten thousand Japanese-language magazines were imported into Brazil. Of these, 35 percent were of one magazine: *Kingu* (the first Japanese magazine to have a circulation in excess of one million), with 3,500 copies. The next was *Shufu no tomo*, one of the most popular “women’s magazines” in Japan, with 1,200 copies. By contrast, only eighty copies of *Kaizō* and seventy copies of *Chūō kōron* entered the country that month.

Although I have not found any evidence of a booksellers’ association (書籍組合) of the sort that existed throughout Japan, its colonies, and even North America, an advertisement from 11 July 1929 reveals the existence of an importing collective, the São Paulo Motherland Products Import Association (サンパウロ母国品輸入組合), which possessed a book and magazine division (書籍雑誌部).¹¹⁰ This particular advertisement announced the arrival of more than 250 newly published book titles (including prices, but not authors) to be offered for sale at stores that were members of the association. The advertisement lists twenty-one members in various cities.¹¹¹ Stores that specialized in books emerged, not just in the city of São Paulo, but in the interior as well. A few examples from the mid-1930s were Nippon Shoten in Lins, Chiyoda Shoten in Santos, Takahashi Yūmeidō (Livraria dos Amigos) in Araçatuba (with a branch store in Guararapes), Mikado Bunbōgu-ten in Bastos, and Mariria Shoten in Marília.¹¹²

There are indications that these competitors would work in concert when it suited their interests, even in the absence of a formal booksellers’ association,

as when increased costs necessitated across-the-board price hikes. For example, on 15 February 1932, Nakaya Shōten, Hase Shōten, and Endō Shoten published a joint announcement in the *Burajiru jihō*, in which they explained that they had intended to drop their magazine prices as a result of currency fluctuations, but that this had been rendered impossible by the recent changes in Brazilian postal law. In December 1931, the Departamento de Correios e Telégrafos (Department of Mail and Telegraphs) had been established within the Ministry of Industry, Transport, and Public Works. The three booksellers claimed that the new postal laws had resulted in a tripling of postal rates. On 15 May 1937, another notification explained that magazine prices had been raised due to a doubling of postage on materials sent overseas from Japan that went into effect on April 1.¹¹³ The notification was sponsored by six stores carrying Japanese-language magazines in the city of São Paulo: Hase Shoten, Nakaya Shōten, Kunii Shōten, Sugayama Shōten, Endō Shoten, and Tōyō Shoten.

This increasingly large and mature marketplace for print seems to have come to the attention of Tokyo-based publishers from at least 1929, when they began running sizable advertisements in the local vernacular newspapers. For print capital based in Tokyo, these migrant communities presented a rich new market, an audience thought to have an insatiable desire for the cultural products of their home. Tokyo-based publishers and Brazil-based retailers launched significant newspaper advertising campaigns—more than the largely functional advertisements seen prior to this time—directed at these consumers. As one advertisement had it: “In a foreign land, without a doubt one of the greatest sources of consolation is a magazine from dear old Japan.”¹¹⁴

Homesickness was not the only object of these advertisements: publishers and booksellers recognized that they could use a litany of fears that they presumed were shared by the community—of falling out of touch, of being insufficiently patriotic, of somehow becoming less-than-fully Japanese—to sell their products as the solution to this alienation of a diasporic existence.¹¹⁵ Appeals to nationalism seemed to have been used to lend gravity to advertisements from early on:

With the conclusion of the agreement to reduce military forces [the Five-Power Naval Limitation Treaty, signed 6 February 1922], the age of military might has ended and a new age of intellectual competition has begun. In order to stand at the forefront of society henceforth, the natural next step is for each and every individual to refine his intellect and expand his ken. To that end, our company has the ambitious plan to distribute broadly and rapidly an even greater range of newly published books and magazines from the homeland, which are the source of this intellectual strength.¹¹⁶

The companies also took advantage of concerns thought to be shared by many of the migrants, that they were being left behind as Japan moved forward without them:

With each passing day, with each passing month, your motherland’s culture is advancing. Is it not the case that all of you are falling behind? It is for this reason

in particular that we consider our work of importing new books and offering them to you to be a service to society.¹¹⁷

Companies based in Tokyo were also aware of the effectiveness of this rhetoric in stirring both nationalism and insecurity:

To all of our readers in foreign countries!! Aren't you thrilled to hear news from the homeland when you are abroad? It is magazines from the homeland that allow you to forget the sadness of being all alone in this world and feel the ease and consolation you would enjoy if you were there!! Women's magazines in particular are the singular sustenance of the soul for all of you overseas!!¹¹⁸

As Japanese militarism increased the rhetoric escalated commensurately, tapping nationalism, alienation, fear, and pride all at once:

The nation's (国家) greatest blessing and its ultimate root is its unaffected and vigorous spirit. At this very moment the homeland, which is once again facing unprecedented adversities, has keenly committed itself to those virtues. Our homeland cultivated its national prestige through the efforts of the patriotic Japanese spirit and the national unity of seventy million brethren until it became the Japan that now shines brilliantly amid the countries of the world. This is not an autumn [n.b.: the ad appeared in late autumn, given the local season in Brazil] through which we, alone here in a foreign land, can remain uninvolved. We wish to draw on this new Japanese spirit, devise methods of spiritual cultivation, and display that spirit to people of other nations as men of the world. For some time now, our store has dedicated all of its energies to the advancement of the national (国民) spirit through its spirit of enterprise devoted to our nation. We believe that the regular reading of magazines from the homeland is the greatest means to cultivate the Japanese spirit here in this foreign land. With this in mind, we . . . have begun soliciting subscriptions for the coming year at prices that sacrifice our margin even as we offer valuable prizes for subscribers. We strongly hope that our loyal readers will continue to elevate Japan's national prestige.¹¹⁹

Print capitalism rapidly adapted to what it thought to be the specific psychology of its immigrant consumers in the hopes of marketing products as effectively as possible.

1934-41: A SIZABLE, STABILIZED MARKETPLACE

Despite this rapid expansion of immigration from Japan in the first part of the 1930s, some developments were already underway that would put an end to this rapid growth. With regard to the domestic situation within Brazil, one series of developments demands particular attention. In October 1930, Getúlio Vargas led a coup d'état that overthrew the existing government, and shortly thereafter declared a (limited) moratorium on immigration for the year 1931.¹²⁰ Because the moratorium explicitly exempted agricultural workers (under certain conditions), immigration from Japan did not cease; it did, however, fall during that year. The

pressure from *fazendeiros* (plantation owners) in São Paulo against this ban was great; their desire for laborers from Japan, in fact, regularly exceeded the number that the KKKK could recruit.¹²¹

The pro-immigration position of the plantation owners in São Paulo, however, differed from the anti-immigration (particularly anti-Japanese immigration) position of certain racist intellectuals and politicians, particularly in the state of Rio de Janeiro. With the new Vargas regime, these groups found a political environment that was more receptive to their thinking, which saw Japanese immigrants as both unassimilable (and thus destabilizing to the nation) and possibly even agents of Japanese imperial expansion. This led to the addition of the “Miguel Couto Amendment” to the 1934 Constitution, which imposed a quota on subsequent immigration.¹²² Modeled on the similar system in the United States, the quota limited annual immigration to 2 percent of the total number of immigrants from the source country over previous fifty years. The desired effect of this quota system was to significantly limit migration from Asia, and Japan in particular. The quota set for Japan, based on an extrapolated total drawn from migration between 1908–33, was 2,711 persons (as compared to 11,498 for Portugal, 3,838 for Italy, and 6,039 for Spain, for example).¹²³ Pressure from pro-Japanese immigration advocates resulted in adjustments and exemptions being made to this quota, thus diminishing its impact through 1937, when various factors (including the outbreak of war with China) led to an even more dramatic decline.¹²⁴

On the other side of the Pacific, the focus of migration also shifted around this time. Although migration to Manchuria from Japan had been discussed by the Japanese government as early as 1906, the general attitude was that it was not as promising as migration to Korea, Taiwan, or even the Americas.¹²⁵ After the Japanese government established the puppet state of Manchukuo in 1932, however, this began to change quickly. By 1936, the Hirota cabinet had made emigration to, and colonization of, Manchuria a priority of state policy; the concomitant state support transformed what had been a local movement of minimal size into a phenomenon with national scope. Whereas an estimated 15,079 individuals had migrated to Manchuria between 1932 and 1936, 140,363 migrated there between 1937 and 1941.¹²⁶

Despite this shift, the preceding decades had already resulted in a significant population of Japanese citizens in Brazil, and an even larger population of individuals who could comprehend the Japanese language to some extent. The precise size of that population, however, is not entirely clear. The 1940 Brazilian census gives us some information about the “Japanese” population in that country on the eve of the Second World War, the vast majority (87 percent) of whom were still involved in agriculture, though many of these had shifted to cultivating cotton after the weakening of the coffee market.¹²⁷ According to that source, 140,693 Japanese lived in Brazil. Of these, 77,200 were men and 63,493 were women. More

than half of them were twenty-nine years of age or younger. 3,830 individuals born in Japan—2,292 men and 1,538 women—were naturalized Brazilian citizens.¹²⁸

At first glance, these numbers seem to contradict the 1 October 1940 count of “countrymen” (邦人) performed by the Japanese government. According to this, 202,514 were living in Brazil.¹²⁹ In this case, “countrymen” seems to refer to individuals who, as in the *Nihon teikoku kokusei ippan* (日本帝国国勢一斑) conducted by the Ministry of Home Affairs (内務省), had their permanent residence (本籍, the location of their family registry [戸籍]) in the “inner territories” of the Japanese empire.¹³⁰ That is, this number included both individuals with Japanese citizenship and individuals with dual citizenship (whom the Brazilian government would have excluded from their total); on the other hand, it would have excluded (for example) individuals with one or more parents who were either voluntarily or involuntarily (as Japanese citizenship required a Japanese father) excluded.

Brazilian-born citizens who possessed one or more parents with Japanese citizenship also make the total number of “Japanese” (in terms of heritage) hard to calculate. The principle of *jus soli* has been a part of Brazilian law since its inclusion in the 1824 Constitution; Japan, however, has followed the principle of *jus sanguinis* since its 1899 Nationality Law (国籍法). As a result, children born of Japanese fathers in Brazil were eligible for dual citizenship. After amendment of the Nationality Law in 1924, however, such children lost their Japanese citizenship two weeks after birth unless they expressly retained it; from 1924, individuals with dual citizenship gained the right to renounce their Japanese citizenship without permission from the Minister of the Interior.¹³¹ It would seem, however, that most children born of Japanese fathers retained their Japanese as well as their Brazilian citizenship, and would have had little cause to renounce either; one source estimates that only around 2,600 children had opted out of their Japanese citizenship.¹³² According to a 1937 survey of 23,549 births to Japanese in the vicinity of Bauru, 52.2 percent maintained dual citizenship, 45.2 percent took Brazilian citizenship only, and 2.6 percent took Japanese citizenship only. A full 35 percent of the 45,637 Japanese citizens living in Bauru in 1937 were second-generation.¹³³ It is possible that in 1940 the number of Nipo-Brasileiros, regardless of citizenship, was in excess of 100,000, making the total number of individuals who might be classified as “Japanese” (in one sense or another) between 200,000 and 250,000.¹³⁴

What is perhaps more germane to this study is the language capacities of these individuals. According to the 1940 Brazilian census, 192,698 individuals stated that Japanese, rather than Portuguese, was the language they used at home; of this number, 70,476 were Brazilian-born, 2,887 were naturalized Brazilians, and 119,095 were foreign nationals.¹³⁵ That is to say, roughly 84 percent of male Japanese citizens and 86 percent of female Japanese citizens spoke Japanese at home, whereas 72 percent of male and 80 percent of female naturalized Brazilians of Japanese birth did. In terms of Brazilian-born descendants of foreign-national fathers,

104,355 listed their fathers as Japanese; of these, 69,304 (66 percent) declared that they did not usually speak Japanese at home.¹³⁶ Of the 3,830 naturalized Brazilians of Japanese birth, 1,425 (37 percent) were described as not speaking Portuguese “correctly” and 2,870 (67 percent) were described as not usually speaking Portuguese in the home.¹³⁷ Of the 140,693 Japanese citizens who lived in Brazil, 64,736 (46 percent) were described as not speaking Portuguese “correctly” and 119,499 (85 percent) were described as not usually speaking Portuguese at home.¹³⁸ When we consider this information in light of the fact that the practice of reading aloud (音読) still persisted in some settings, it seems clear that while most of the individuals consuming Japanese-language literary texts would have been first-generation migrants from Japan, there may have been many 1.5-generation and second-generation Nipo-Brasileiros who were exposed to the works in one form or another as well.

As discussed previously, a diverse array of sources for Japanese-language texts developed during the 1920s and 1930s, with many retailers participating in the marketplace. By the close of that period, however, two key players seemed to have emerged from among this varied competition. In its discussion of the state of the Japanese community in Brazil in 1939, the *Burajiru ni okeru Nihonjin hattenshi* (1953) named only two bookstores in its list of examples of businesses that grew quickly amid the boom in import/export business that year: Endō Shoten and Tōyō Shoten.¹³⁹ This suggests that people had begun to depend on these specialized bookstores, rather than the various general stores. Endō Shoten has already been discussed in detail throughout this chapter; the history of Tōyō Shoten, by contrast, is somewhat harder to reconstruct.

Part of this difficulty is that multiple concerns used variants of this common name. Between the late 1920s and the start of the Second World War, the city of São Paulo had at least three bookstores bearing names that might have been rendered in Portuguese as “Livraria Oriental”: Tōyō Shobō (東洋書房), Tōyō Shoin (東洋書院), and Tōyō Shoten (東洋書店). The second and third of these were related operations; it is not clear that there is a link with the first. Tōyō Shobō, owned by Takeuchi Yosojirō, was active during at least 1928 and 1929.¹⁴⁰ Takeuchi passed away on 20 April 1928, but by July 27 the store was advertising once again and remained in business until at least the end of June, 1929.¹⁴¹ While I have not yet discovered a link with the other two companies, it seems unlikely that such similarly named operations would have co-existed without any connection at all. Given the distressed nature of Tōyō Shobō’s ownership in 1929, it is possible that the subsequent businesses took over the operation.

Tōyō Shoin, known in Portuguese as Livraria Oriental, was run by the author of a Portuguese conversation manual titled *Jitsuyō Burajiru-go*, Iwakami Saisuke, who had arrived in Brazil on 28 August 1931. While it is possible that Iwakami took over the business that had been operated by Takeuchi, it is also possible that the businesses merely shared a fairly intuitive name for such a bookstore. Tōyō Shoin

seems to have specialized in the back issues of magazines that were discussed previously. For example, an advertisement from 6 July 1933 listed issues of popular magazines dating from February 1932 to March 1933, for anywhere from 2.1 *mil réis* to 4.1 *mil réis*. They did, however, also carry books. The company continued in this fashion until 11 April 1934, when it merged with the Goseikai (互生会).¹⁴²

Not only was the Goseikai not a bookseller, it was not even primarily a commercial venture. The founder of the organization, the physician Takaoka Sentarō, had arrived in Brazil in June 1917 as the commissioned doctor for the Overseas Development Company, having previously worked at the Meiji Byōin in Fukushima.¹⁴³ In 1924, Takaoka was made director of the newly founded Dōjinkai, which engaged in medical research on key diseases such as malaria; the organization published a number of books on hygiene, prevention, and treatment. Traveling throughout the immigrant colonies in Brazil, Takaoka played a central role in addressing a variety of communicable diseases that were affecting those communities.

Takaoka established the Goseikai in 1933, chiefly in order to improve hygienic practices within immigrant households.¹⁴⁴ In addition to its section dedicated to hygiene, this “department store of social projects” had five additional divisions: publishing, information, education, consultation, and book retailing. The Goseikai considered the proliferation of Japanese-language magazines to be a worthy social project; to that end, it advertised that it was making magazines available nearly at cost.¹⁴⁵ The Goseikai argued that the magazines would help second-generation Japanese learn characters (漢字) and thus avoid what the organization believed was an inevitable weakening of their minds in Brazil. On 11 April 1934, the Goseikai announced that its book division would merge with Tōyō Shoin to form a new Goseikai retail book division.¹⁴⁶ On 18 April 1934, the new advertisements for the Goseikai Retail Book Division, also known as the Livraria Goseikai, appear within advertisements for the Goseikai itself.¹⁴⁷

At the same time, the Goseikai reiterated its offer to other bookstores to provide distribution services to them, promising advantageous wholesale rates to any bookstore that became one of its special retail agents (特約店). This had been the relationship of Tōyō Shoin to the Goseikai since at least 14 April 1932. The Goseikai offered its services as a distributor of specially priced new books and *tsuki-okure* magazines to its special retail agents, which they limited to only one per community. As of 9 May 1934, the organization stated that it had already concluded agreements with agents in Lins, Cafelândia, Marília, Bastos, Registro, Santos, Campinas, Guararapes, Campo Grande, and Cambará.¹⁴⁸ They also began recruiting sales representatives; by 23 May 1934, they had people in Penápolis, Marília, Bela Cruz, Pompéia, Aliança, Cerqueira César, Agudos, Mato Grosso, and Tietê.¹⁴⁹ This number, and the regions they covered, increased over the subsequent weeks.

The Goseikai continued to function as a distributor of books and magazines from Japan, going on to develop the Goseikai Shōhi Kumiai (消費組合), which

required that people become members in order to purchase from it.¹⁵⁰ On 8 August 1934, Goseikai Shoten relocated to Rua Conselheiro Furtado, 2-A; the same advertisement lists eight regional special sales agent stores (特約販売店), most of which were general stores (商店).¹⁵¹ These were located in Lins, Cafelândia, Bastos, Jaboticabal, Birigui, Campo Grande, and Marília. On 16 October 1935, Livraria Goseikai (互生会書店) advertised a practical Portuguese conversation and composition (会話・作文実用ブラジル語) textbook, written by Iwakami.¹⁵² An identical ad appears in the *Nippaku shinbun* as late as 25 July 1936.

At some point between June 1936 and May 1937, it seems likely that Iwakami changed the name of the Goseikai Shoten to Tōyō Shoten. That is not to say that the Goseikai did not continue in the publishing business. On 9 March 1937, for example, the Goseikai published a notification that the *Burajiru no katei isho* (医書) had been delayed by a printing problem but was now available and would be delivered to those who had pre-ordered.¹⁵³ No street address was given (only a postal box number), nor was the bookstore mentioned in the advertisement. It is also possible that the Goseikai continued to function as a book and magazine wholesaler. Its retail operation remained under the direction of Iwakami, but with a new name.¹⁵⁴ Whatever the relation between the two stores, Tōyō Shoten's operation was large: on 1 December 1939, the bookstore ran a massive, full-page catalog-style ad listing hundreds of titles.¹⁵⁵ This complex history might explain why the *Hattenshi* would have identified the operation alongside Endō Shoten, despite the fact that the former had only been in business under its current name for relatively short period.

This was the peak of the marketplace for books in prewar Brazil. In late 1939, with the creation of its Departamento de Imprensa e Propaganda, the Brazilian government began censoring Japanese-language newspapers and magazines. That year saw a net loss in immigration from Japan, with 1,314 new immigrants arriving, but 2,011 returning to Japan. In January 1940, the Brazilian government began a registry of foreign residents. The last boatload of prewar immigrants arrived in June 1941. From August 1941, publication of foreign-language newspapers was banned.¹⁵⁶ According to Mario Yendo, the son of Endō Tsunehachirō, Endō Shoten's retail sales were severely disrupted by the end of imports from Japan in November 1941, but the company remained in business after that, continuing to lend books out of a storage room even after the store was closed, until 1942, when the government truly cracked down and gathered up Japanese-language texts. Endō Shoten would not reopen until 1947.¹⁵⁷

TERRITORIALIZATION AND JAPANESE LITERATURE

As the preceding overview shows, “Japan” as a polity had a central role in determining the scope and nature of the potential reading community and thus is a logical factor to bring into any consideration of these texts and their readers in the

aggregate. To suggest, however, that this government's impact was the only one of significance would be mistaken. Not only was Japan not the only nation involved, but in addition other political formations (such as Brazilian states or Japanese prefectures) at different levels of locality had a similarly important impact. Similarly, spatial proximity or lack thereof had a noteworthy impact on the accessibility of texts, reminding us of one of the many ways that literature and territories are linked.

What does this partial snapshot of the marketplace for Japanese-language literary texts in São Paulo tell us? One thing is obvious: that the literary marketplace in Brazil was closely connected with the literary marketplace in Japan, itself concentrated almost entirely in Tokyo. Yet, as with regional markets there and throughout the empire, the selection was limited, idiosyncratic, and operating on an altered temporality from that of Tokyo (much less that of an idealized literary history), and the texts that dominated all of these markets were not the texts that dominate our critical attention. Having said that, attention to politics, and borders in particular, is important: sheer geographical distance, shipping costs (and lack of unified shipping costs within a given political territory), taxation, the persistence of a *de facto* final sales system rather than the adoption of a consignment system, and the altered impact of censorship regimes all speak to the salience of political boundaries and unified territories. In these aspects and more, the function of the national polity in thinking about texts in the aggregate is essential, but the nature of that function is not self-evident.