

# The Changing Face of Globalization

## *World Order Crisis, (In)security Challenges, and Russia's Adaptation to Globalization*

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### ABSTRACT

International trends associated with the crisis of the world order, the strengthening of the positions of non-Western players, the uncertain global cooperation, as well as the COVID-19-related health crisis entail a change in the role, place, and prominence of globalization. While the processes of globalization face many challenges, more pragmatic and realistic assessments of the phenomenon have taken place. Globalization did not come to an end and the logic of global economic, social, technological, and informational advances even promise a new phase of globalization. However, the changing mode of globalization created variable domestic responses to global forces that became unpredictable and unstable. Globalization processes develop at different rates, with different outcomes in different countries of the world. The crisis of the global liberal world order that has applied many brakes on various engines of globalization forces us to rethink the role and position of Russia, one of the major non-Western players in the world. Russia's response to globalization takes the form of a controversial adjustment to the rapidly changing external environment. Russia is developing its own vision of globalization and international politics, cultivating a pragmatic strategy based on selective and cautious receptiveness in pursuit of national interests.

### KEYWORDS

foreign policy, globalization, human security, Russia, world order crisis

The very idea of globalization sparks wide-ranging debates on the nature and driving forces of global processes and on the costs and benefits of an integrated, globalized world driven by economic development, political changes, technological

breakthroughs, cultural stimuli, and improvements in communication. Globalization has acquired multiple definitions, with many of them referring to realization of extensive linkages and intensified interconnectedness, resulting in interdependence of economic, political, social, and cultural spheres. Scholars underscore “an intensification of the range and speed of contacts among different parts of the world and an expansion of the kinds of activities intimately involved in global interactions” (Stearns, 2020: 6). Advanced economic integration via market openness, intensified trade, and investment became the main instruments that provide an innovative opportunity to improve the process of production. The information and communication revolutions, as well as advances in innovation, contributed to the technology momentum. Politically and ideologically, globalization has been associated with the victory of the global liberal world order, political liberalism, and the spread of liberal-democratic norms and values from the West to the rest of the world (Kortunov, 2020b).

Recently, however, the liberal world order started to display the symptoms of decline. The decline is seen as growing discontent among a number of non-Western states over the global politics, waning Western leadership, severe competition between major powers, obstacles to growth, uneven development, and resentment of global interdependence, as well as rising populism, nationalism, and authoritarianism (Haass, 2019; Ikenberry, 2018a; Dumcombe & Dunn, 2018; Flew, 2018; Hooghe, Lenz, & Mark, 2019). The irritation and tensions about the injustices and inequalities of the global system created growing dissent and opposition to globalization in many countries (Sparke, 2013). Moreover, there are unsettled contradictions between the more globalized economic structure of the world and the political facet, in which universal and effective mechanisms of global governance have never been established (Kochtcheeva, 2020a). The attack launched by politics against economy, such as unilateral sanctions and trade wars, created direct obstacles for developing international connectedness and sharply increased the volatility of the global system (Kortunov, 2020b). The challenges to global interlinkages also made it crucial to have a new look at the notion of the universal commons, including global climate change, transboundary pollution, conservation, health, migration, and others. The COVID-19 health crisis became a massive “stress test for globalization . . . forcing a major reevaluation of the interconnected global economy” (Farrell & Newman, 2020). With critical supply chains fracturing, travel intensifying precipitous infection, and companies, communities, and entire states realizing their vulnerability, a turn in power dynamics among major world economies is taking place (Niblett, 2020). The pandemic has generated public demand for protectionist strategies in domestic policy and for nationalism in foreign policy. As such, the international trends associated with the crisis of the world order, the changing positions of non-Western players, the uneven economic landscape, as well as the COVID-19-related health crisis give rise to a change in the role, place, and prominence of globalization.

While globalization faces many challenges, more pragmatic and realistic assessments of the phenomenon have taken place. Globalization did not come to an end and the logic of global economic, social, technological, and informational advances even promises a new phase of globalization. However, the changing mode of globalization created variable domestic responses to global forces that became unpredictable and unstable. Globalization processes develop at different rates, with different outcomes in different countries of the world. Under such conditions, each country will have to rethink its strategy of struggle for survival and development (Tsygankov, 2019). The character of global instability is also determined by struggles within countries, by the levels of competition between them, and by the tensions in global and regional international political and economic spheres. The crisis of the global liberal world order that has applied many brakes on various engines of globalization forces us to rethink the role and position of Russia, one of the major non-Western players, in the world. After discussing the crisis of the global order and problems of human security, this chapter analyzes the character of Russia's involvement with globalization under the conditions of changing world order before the beginning of the war in Ukraine. It will demonstrate that Russia's response to globalization represents a contentious adjustment to the rapidly changing external environment. Russia is developing its own vision of globalization and international politics cultivating a pragmatic strategy, based on selective and cautious receptiveness in pursuit of national interests. The chapter concludes by emphasizing a critical need for adjustment between global and domestic elements due to the changing capacities and interests of states, and the failure of current global arrangements to cope with the challenges associated with globalization.

## WORLD ORDER CRISIS, HUMAN SECURITY, AND GLOBALIZATION

### *Global Order Strain and Globalization*

The crisis of the global liberal world order is having a significant impact on globalization. Passionate debates continue on when precisely the turning point in global processes happened and what its specific signs and implications are. First, many would argue that the crisis of the global order might be steering the world into a kind of post-Western global system (Ikenberry, 2018a, 2018b; Wojczewski, 2018). China, Russia, India, Turkey, and other powerful non-Western states are launching their own agendas and ideas for globalization and global order. These actors are challenging the remains of the Western unipolar system, and their ambitions to play a more prominent role in international relations are getting more obvious. However, these countries have different ideas about global transition. While China emphasizes economic leadership, Russia focuses on the governance values, such as national sovereignty, security, and freedom of political and cultural choice.

The crisis of the global order may also be seen as “the foundation for new international connections and solutions” (James, 2021), where countries are involved in pragmatic and “practical, non-ideological, issue-based cooperation” (Acharya, 2017: 282). The conditions of global transition signal that “the post-Western and U.S.-centered world orders will have to learn to coexist to avoid mutually dangerous clashes, while competing for new opportunities on the global scale” (Tsygankov, 2019: 55).

Many non-Western antiglobalists recognize globalization as disadvantageous, creating increased domination by the highly developed nations over the less developed societies, exacerbating economic disparities, and eradicating cultural values and traditions (Hebron & Stack, 2017). While antiglobalists insist that unequal distribution of benefits and the imbalances in economic outcomes and rule-making will keep producing backlashes and further undermine the world economy, many emerging non-Western states are not abandoning globalization. Rather, they are attempting to build leadership and influence within the global system and continue to exploit the benefits of globalization. The economic capacity of China and India underscores the rising role of non-Western states in global governance, specifically in the realm of the international financial institutions and monetary system (Duncombe & Dunn, 2018). Additionally, China’s intricate strategies for the launched Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the One Belt, One Road vision for Eurasian economic cooperation are strong signals of it supporting globalization and even advancing globalization.

Second, some analysts and observers link the change in globalization and global development trends with the weakening of Western/U.S. leadership (Niblett, 2017; Kortunov, 2020a). The most widespread conception of globalization emphasizes westernization, and specifically Americanization of the world. As such, globalization has been understood as the spread of liberalism, rationalism, capitalism, and democracy around the world (Kochtcheeva, 2020b). The aims of the Western and largely U.S. “liberal hegemony” were the promulgation of liberal democracies around the world and promotion of open international economy (Mearsheimer, 2018: 1). Yet, despite its unrivaled power, the United States “did little to address the widening gap between global challenges and the institutions meant to contend with them” (Haass, 2021). The antiglobal and illiberal actions that characterized the U.S. actions, such as withdrawal from a number of multilateral treaties, invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, and the position of the Trump administration on trade, environment, and alliances, have been in sharp contradiction with the processes of globalization. President Trump’s determination to turn to largely national and domestic ways of development, as well as the withdrawal from a number of international agreements, “imperiled” globalization (Patrick, 2017). His rejection of two international integration projects, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), signaled to the world that the expansion of the liberal trade regime did not benefit U.S. domestic interests and society. The beginning of the crisis is also marked by the outbreak of the

U.S.- China trade and technology war in 2017–18 (Kortunov, 2020b). The unfolded global circumstances of these conflicts are the result of the United States abandoning “its multilateral cooperative positions for the primacy doctrines” (Steinbock, 2018) and the failure to adapt to China’s rise (Haass, 2021). Still the turning point could also be traced in the slightly more distant past, pinpointing the Global Financial Crisis of 2008–9, when the global community missed its opportunity to create a new and more efficient way to manage the global economy (Flew, 2018). After the crisis, China and large emerging economies fueled the international economy, which was consequently spared from a global depression. However, as G20 cooperation subsided, so did global growth prospects and the future of global economic integration (Steinbock, 2018). Currently, President Biden promises to provide global leadership by strengthening the transatlantic community, encouraging globalization, upholding alliances, and promoting liberal democratic solidarity, which is highly valued and celebrated by the globalists.

Third, the changes in globalization are progressively shaped by the challenges that countries face domestically and internationally. Globalization highlights the uniqueness of each state and society against the backdrop of interdependencies and communication with other states and societies. The pressure to conform to globalizing processes is reframing the nature, role, and functions of the states, causing states to adapt to global economic and political circumstances or demonstrate resilience and will to determine their own economic, social, and political policies. Domestication of decisions affects the functioning of the global order and remains the challenge to that same order. States, especially strong ones, continue to defend and promote sovereignty and act in a way that reflects their national interests (Kochtcheeva, 2020b). Domestic policies towards trade and investment are naturally political and cannot be estimated merely by reference to their efficiency and cost. Income inequalities are growing both between and within countries, concerns about national security are becoming paramount, and trust between countries is in decline (Strange, 2020). Multinational businesses feel the need to tackle the pressure between being globally competitive and being locally responsible to the domestic societies (Madhok, 2021). Additionally, the COVID-19 pandemic has pushed for nation-centric policies, especially trade protectionism, “driving the trend of deglobalization” (Heungchong, 2020). However, no strictly independent solutions seem to be possible. Today’s world is characterized by a far greater degree of complexity and interdependence, which means that reducing current global relations to traditional intercountry relations is an unreasonably complicated if not an impossible enterprise.

Finally, the distress in the nature of globalization, stemming from the crisis of the global order, may lie not in the phenomenon as such, but rather in the incapacity or reluctance of the international community to govern efficiently the course of globalization. It means that the principal problems of globalization are connected to the lack of global governance mechanisms that are adequate to the new realities of international life. As global leadership has deteriorated and

the rivalry between major powers has increased, including over responses to the COVID-19 threat, the time has come to explore new directions for international cooperation (Heungchong, 2020). There is a need to reform existing global institutions and create new ones in order to achieve “a more delicate balance between global rules and norms on one hand and the diverse circumstances that different countries face on the other hand” (Madhok, 2021: 201). The global community of states turned out to have been unprepared for the crisis and unable to propose a well-organized and credible model for combating global common challenges, including the current health crisis. The crisis of international organizations and multilateral institutions, including the United Nations, the European Union, the World Trade Organization, and others also serves as an indicator of the incapacity of these entities to act as leaders channeling the efforts of international actors into restoring the governability of the international system. Overall, humanity’s willingness to work together to fight common challenges, be they disasters or epidemics, has been declining for at least the last decade. The features of current global politics represent the persistent promotion of nationalism and national exceptionalism, the disrespect for international law, and the prioritizing of short-term interests over long-term ones (Kortunov, 2020b).

### *Human Security and Globalization*

The concept of human security, introduced by the United Nations Development Programme in 1994 (UNDP 1994), is widely celebrated as a welcome change to conventional understandings of security. While traditional concept of security revolved around military preparedness against foreign adversaries, and the protection of scientific and security information, a new vision of security focuses on human vulnerability issues across the globe. It is a more comprehensive concept addressing violent conflict, as well as resource exhaustion, health pandemics, poverty, human rights violations, and environmental degradation. Today, human security is a catchword for describing the difficult challenges that individuals, societies, and the whole global community face in attaining safety and well-being in an insecure world (Homolar, 2015).

A comprehensive and more nuanced understanding of globalization should take into account the simultaneous emergence of multiple dimensions of structural and relational reality, which includes socioeconomic, political, cultural, technological, informational, as well as security components. As a process, globalization is powerful, because it places a human dimension into a steady focus. Human security problems, which are clearly manifested in new nonconventional areas, such as cyber security, energy security, food security, environmental security, and others, especially deserve attention in the global world since many of these problems are of a pronounced global, not regional or local, nature. Ideally, globalization offers new opportunities for addressing the problems of human security, jointly preventing disasters, combating pandemics, international terrorism, and

climate change. In a world facing enormous challenges, solutions are global public goods (James, 2021). As such, globalization can also serve as the necessary arena for protecting universal human interests.

The majority of current human development and security challenges arise from numerous circumstances that are interconnected and mutually reinforcing under globalization (UN, 2016). Countries respond differently to the opportunities and challenges of globalization due to their domestic political, socioeconomic, and cultural situations. In a very similar vein, because conditions for human security differ considerably across and within countries, and at different points in time, human security reinforces national solutions, which are tailored to domestic experiences. While national governments hold the major role and responsibility for guaranteeing the safety, survival, and well-being of their citizens, the function of the global institutions and community is to provide the necessary support to states upon their request, “so as to strengthen their capacity to respond to current and emerging threats” (UN, 2016: 6). Achieving greater human security necessitates more effective cooperation and partnership among states, by addressing the actual causes of problems and by developing solutions that are in themselves sustainable and resilient.

Both human security and globalization emphasize the interconnectedness and interdependencies of multiple actors and institutions in the world. Both require an assessment of opportunities, capacities, risks, and challenges. Globalization can and does influence human security through political, social, economic, and cultural transformations. On the one hand, globalization may improve human security by enhancing economic well-being, improving cultural understandings, and providing greater levels of political empowerment and personal freedom. On the other hand, it may exacerbate many human insecurities by increasing uneven development, eroding cultural identities, promoting environmental degradation, and alienation, especially in the developing countries. Globalization, as a powerful, transforming force, initiates variable changes geared toward affecting human life. Therefore, the challenges of human security require an integrated global multilateral response by the global system, a consistent human security approach that focuses on the globalization of responsibility (Sommaruga, 2004).

#### RUSSIA'S ADAPTATION TO GLOBALIZATION

Russia's experience with globalization is highly complex and diverse. Since the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has been challenged by the need to fundamentally reconstruct its state, political and economic institutions, identity, power, and international image. The country struggled to do so in the threatening, challenging, and unusual environment of the globalizing world. In the early 1990s, Russia made a strategic decision in favor of integration into West-promoted globalization, as it promised extensive prospects for economic



development, trade, scientific connections, technology breakthrough, communications, and enhancement of cultures via the spread of norms and ideas.

Russia endured an overwhelming political and socioeconomic transition and incorporation into the globalizing world, adopting the Western course of transformations. The country was also trying to regain its strength and get back to its own roots, as well as give meaning to the confounding changes in the world around. The West welcomed Russia's transformations, assuming that Russia's interests would be similar to most of its interests and goals. However, by the late 1990s many contradictions became obvious. Russia inherited Soviet nuclear capacity, abundance of natural resources, and permanent membership in the UN Security Council, yet the country essentially lost almost all the advantages of a superpower (Nikonov, 2004). Russia was hard-pressed to verify its international standing and recognition, as well as plead for economic assistance. It had become an internally weak state with porous borders, a frail army, an undetermined identity, and an absence of reliable allies. Understanding its economic and technological backwardness and the limitations of the existing political institutions for conducting an independent foreign policy, Russia accepted U.S. global leadership, and its goal became to find a suitable place in its framework.

Relatively quickly, however, Russia developed significant disillusionment with the positions of the West, which used the advantages brought by the end of the Cold War, including NATO's eastward expansion, while Russia bore massive costs in all areas of transformation (Kochtcheeva, 2020a, 2020b). The West continued to celebrate an unforeseen victory and proclaimed a new world order based on liberal principles, while Russia struggled to survive fighting economic challenges, wars inside its own territory, and social demoralization. Russia was still enthusiastic about the possibility of joining international regimes and organizations, yet this sentiment started gradually giving way to suspicions and growing uncertainty concerning the value that such memberships could have for Russia. Hesitations began to surface as to whether globalization and economic interdependence had the ability to control international political tensions and conflicts (Kortunov, 2020b).

Significantly, Russia's hopes to enroll into the community of the Western states on a more or less equal basis were not fulfilled. The country did not agree with Western expectations and plans for its transformation, while the West was not able to interpret correctly Russian motivations and behavior (Torkunov, 2012; Monaghan, 2016; Bordachev, 2018). There was a continuous concern in the West that Russia would not fit institutionally, strategically, and normatively. NATO's eastward enlargement also made Russian politicians believe that the West was not going to give up protecting its strategic interests and was not interested in a strong, revived Russia (Torkunov, 2012). During the decade after the end of the Cold War, no new power arrangements were established and Russia stayed outside the collective security system represented by NATO, which resulted in a series of



negative implications, including a sense of exclusion and alienation. As such, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, Russia was compelled to create a new concept of global relations, outlining the conditions for great powers to recognize the security, sovereignty, and other national interests of other countries in a legitimate manner (Tsygankov, 2014; Safranchuk, 2019). Russia has adopted a different set of priorities and attempted a more selective approach. In political and economic relations, the country insisted on preserving state sovereignty and the right to defend itself against external destructive influences, as well as to promote its own vision of globalization. As a reemerging state, Russia strove to determine its role in a globalizing world and to ensure that the post-Cold War power shift would be characterized by interdependence and interlinkages, as well as an expanded collective security system. Yet, any Russian attempt to fit into the political, ideological, and value system created by the West without Russia's participation and without taking its interests into account did not agree with the implied one-sided adaptation to the West-promoted liberal order (Lukyanov, 2020). Russia became "trapped into a strategic impasse," where it could be "a great power but an outsider; or a member of the Historical West, but at the price of renouncing its autonomy as a great power" (Sakwa, 2017: 9, 23).

In the society, the anxiety about globalization was amplified by the belief that globalization was not a result of impersonal forces of interconnectedness and integration, but rather that globalization was controlled by the outside hegemonic project of the West. Attempts to build a competitive market economy and a democratic polity collided with the historical legacy of autocracy, identity struggles, and developmental strains. The complexity and costs of the formation of a new political and economic system in the Western manner appeared to be much higher than could have been foreseen. As globalization increased its pace largely based on the advances in technological innovation and information economy, Russia realized its technological and economic backwardness. Globalization became mainly associated with the "shock therapy," the collapse of the system, and inability to preserve previously achieved living standards, which led to social and economic deprivation (Kochtcheeva, 2020b). Entering globalization through liberalization and privatization was accompanied by a hostile attitude toward these phenomena, and the revival of the ideas of nationalism and patriotism. Economic and social reforms and the inclusion in integration processes were contrasted with the ideas of a strong state, sovereignty, and the uniqueness of Russia's own development. Additionally, many Russians perceive the globally promoted concepts of freedom, justice, and order, not as conflicting binary rivals, but as values that are equally necessary for the normal life of the country and every individual. Globalization as westernization did not bring the expected benefits and threatened to transform sovereignty, statehood, and society. Russia preferred to follow its own path of development, defending its own national interests and its role in the international arena in the context of both positive and negative outcomes of

globalization. Russia chose to transform itself from a dedicated follower of the West to its critic, pursuing expansion of its influence in global decision-making, institutions, markets, and values.

As globalization continued its advance, Russia demonstrated a complex and even contradictory relationship with it, oscillating from adaptation to confrontation with the global order. On the one hand, the official rhetoric indicates the desire to transform Russia into an integral part of the global economy. On the other hand, the risks associated in one way or another with globalization, such as deepening inequality, increased financial instability, and the spread of cross-border economic crime, are constantly brought to the discussion. Emphasis is also repeatedly placed on preventing globalization from undermining the standing of nation-states as the principal actors in global politics and economics (Kortunov, 2020b).

The results of globalization in the late 2010s indicate that Russia's efforts to integrate into the global economic interlinkages in the 2000s were only marginally successful. Rich in natural resources, with significant liquidity, declining poverty and unemployment, and strengthening currency, Russia was becoming a force among the global emerging market nations, taking the twelfth place in the world by nominal value up until 2013 (Kochtcheeva, 2020b). Yet, a gradual decline of economic growth emerged and was accompanied by increasing disparities in manufacturing, decreasing innovation by producers, intensification of imbalances of technical characteristics of fixed assets, and investments in fixed assets by principal economic activities. Reliance on natural resources and a highly energy-focused economy still serves as a double-edged sword for Russia, leaving the country vulnerable to credit and commodity market fluctuations. The structure of Russia's exports changed little, and the country is still unable to become a full-fledged member of global technological chains. At the same time, Russia's dependence on the outside world has been increasing, which produced new economic and political risks. The financial crisis of 2008–9 was unanticipated and very distressing for Russia. However, in 2014, when Russia-West relations came into an acute crisis, Russia's global integration agenda became the geopolitical agenda (Kortunov, 2020b). The Ukrainian crisis of 2014, the imposition of sanctions, falling oil prices, and continued geopolitical uncertainty created an increasingly difficult situation in the Russian economy, and it became much harder to create a well-devised alternative to Russia's comprehensive integration into the global economy. Russia continues to experience complex challenges posed by the direct need for economic adjustment to external challenges coupled with major internal long-term changes in its economy and society. Currently, the external shocks, including the fight against COVID-19 and the crisis with Ukraine, coupled with preexisting structural inefficiencies and lack of innovation, as well as weakened consumption and investment, impact Russia's growth prospects. A more successful realization of economic globalization will depend on involving main economic actors in the process of developing innovative changes, implementation of the technological

breakthrough, and achieving accelerated developments in priority industries, which can provide for the transition from aspirations to achievements.

In the context of world order transition, the current health crisis, uneven globalization, and the rise of non-Western powers, Russia is reassessing its role in the world, its interests, and relations with the West. Russia started to see itself as one of the most important players in the international arena, advancing its own conditions in shaping the global order, interweaving involvement with skepticism and openness with nationalism. Russia has developed a very aggressive foreign policy defending its security and statehood, and it is overtaken by discussions of a profound crisis of the liberal world order and of the relevancy of the Westphalian principles of structuring the international system. The country assigns itself a special role in global processes, protecting its own sovereignty, identity, independence, and security. Russia's response to globalization does not seek to isolate the country from the international society, but it challenges the prerogative of the West to define its norms and order. This view presupposes the establishment of a natural balance, sensibly taking into account the most important interests of each country in world affairs. It does not challenge the foundations of international society, but it rejects the practices of the unipolar power system.

Russia seeks a global strategy as a participant in creation of the norms and rules for the new globalizing world order together with other actors. It views this new order as polycentric, where old architects and new builders of globalization participate in organizing and structuring world and regional orders, participate in global governance, and have certain autonomy in conducting foreign policy. In the last decade, the strategic line of Russian international behavior has also consisted of challenging the West-promoted globalization to secure the search for new rules of the game in global multipolar politics (Kanet, 2018). Russia has already demonstrated that it can handle some of the most acute challenges of regional and global security. As the world is developing further by going on a new level to the system of states interconnected by globalization, the gap between exacerbation of the global problems, on the one hand, and nationalization of their solutions and deglobalization of governance, on the other hand, is growing. Taking into account all the difficulties and challenges that Russia is facing as a result of the unstable global situation, exacerbated by the continuing COVID-19 crisis, Russia was better prepared for the crisis than many of its partners and competitors. The West is fixated on Russia and the traditional security agenda, and this obsession was of no help in responding to the crisis and its challenges. For a long time now, Russia's strategy has been largely devised to deal with an unfavorable international environment, a world where geopolitical interests prevail over economic practicality and international conflicts prevail over cooperation. However, effective global strategy is only possible if the country demonstrates its ability to cope with the economic recession and the pandemic while incurring minimal losses to living standards and retaining the prospect of a rapid postcrisis economic growth. A much more

challenging undertaking, though, is defeating the attitudes that currently prevail in Russian society, including the feeling of self-sufficiency, tremendous skepticism of the outside world, and isolationism, rooted in Russia's historical experience, national psychology, and social instincts. Russian society will benefit by appreciating the opportunities for its own development, and not just assessing the security challenges (Kortunov, 2020b). The major goal for Russia's global strategy is to help domestic society integrate itself into the coming global world without sacrificing its national identity to globalization.

Nevertheless, among the opportunities presented by the current crisis are the prospects for Russia to more actively advance its vision of the nature of the current international system, its development drivers, and the desired parameters of the new world order. It is an opportunity to show that it is also a skilled architect who is prepared, along with its partners, to advance individual mechanisms, principles, and models of the new world order that is still under construction (Ivanov 2019). The development of new ways and niches of international cooperation for the future is of growing importance. Such areas as global energy security, food security, cyber security, and cooperation on climate and environmental issues are promising. A core task is the elaboration of a global system that would ensure stability and security in the world, make rules of conduct for the global economy and trade, and defuse the existing challenges and risks while preventing the emergence of new ones (Kochtcheeva, 2020a). There are objective preconditions for shaping an inclusive global order in which each state would assume its share of responsibility for the future of humanity, and in which the global community protects international law and the legitimate interests of each of its members.

Russia's adaptation to globalization should be viewed as an outcome of a constant adjustment to the ever-changing global and domestic challenges and the way Russia's sources of power and identity have developed. Russia's systemic vision of the world and its own role in the global order encompasses the goal of supporting mutually beneficial frameworks and partnerships guided by the principles of sovereignty, practicality, openness, and commitment to uphold national interests, yet contributing to international cooperation on a nondiscriminatory basis.

## CONCLUSIONS

Globalization brought the countries of the world into the web of interconnectedness, pushing them to address the problems of economic development, security, innovations, access to resources, technology, and value systems. The discontents of interdependencies uncover the fact that, while the problems reveal globalizing tendencies, many responses to them remain domestic. The crisis of the global world order indicates that there are limits to the borderless nature of globalization that can be set by national governments. The global setting started shifting, and the

challenge for the countries became one of figuring out how to build international relations, foreign policy, and domestic responses when crucial facets of the international order are in motion. The deep cut between the interdependence of states and their inability to reach an agreement, to build a more or less stable system of international relations that is not reduced to constant geopolitical squabbles, creates a difficult situation. A significant element of adjustment between global and national elements is needed as a result of fluctuating capacities, uncertain inclinations, growing ambitions, and the inability of current arrangements to cope with the challenges associated with globalization. Countries need a new concept of the world order and a radical new look at globalization.

It is worth mentioning that the transformation of the global world order should not focus on the eradication of the social, cultural, and humanistic gains that have been attained throughout the course of globalization. The central feature of the emerging world might be the absence of universal ideas about the “correct” structure, behavior, and values of individual states (Valdai Club, 2018). Especially, the multiplicity of forms of political structure and social inclinations may increase, and the willingness of states and societies to adjust themselves to some uniform external patterns may likely lessen. Refuting the imposition of standards and values should not discount the willingness to imitate the successful types and models of development in the interests of domestic progress and global well-being and security.

What form could the political, legal, and economic basis of a new world order take that would ensure global development, security, and stability? Hardly anyone could propose a plan for world development, yet realistic parameters for the prospect of a global transition to a new international system and a new balance of power are important for Russia and other emerging powers. What is needed is not only a clear understanding of the country’s national interests, but also a clear understanding of its capabilities and weaknesses. The changing international situation demands from Russia and other countries a flexible and timely response to new challenges, which arise in the course of the evolution of the entire system of global development. Without a doubt, the role of human security factors—education, science, health, culture, environment—should increase in the system of global interconnectedness as globalization opens up windows of opportunity for cooperation in exceedingly varied realms of human activity, alleviating international excesses. To overcome the crisis, the world powers need to agree on the mode of interaction and divide the problems into those that can be solved and those that cannot be solved but can be managed. Humanity is faced with the task of creating a new global system that will reduce political, economic, climate, and resource risks and present a new viewpoint based on the balance of power and multilateral security, rational use of resources, social justice, and respect in international relations.

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