

Groundwork

The Coloniality of Space

Abeid's half-acre plot was located on a gentle slope near the tarmac road that wound through the center of Salasala. On it he had built a modest concrete block, three-bedroomed house and a couple of exterior structures. The interior of his house was finished with white painted walls and shiny white floor tiles, and was sparsely furnished. Now that he had retired from his government clerical job, he preferred to invest his time and money in the project he ran from the other structures he had put up on his plot: a row of modern pens for raising chickens, which he sold to local bars and at local markets. Abeid was a relatively early arriver in Salasala, having bought land in 1995 for TSh150,000 (\$260). When I met him in 2015 he estimated that his plot would sell for around TSh50 million (\$25,108). The huge rise in the value of Abeid's land was not unusual in Salasala. According to one local broker, the going rate for a half-acre plot in a premium location on the tarmac road in Salasala in 2015 was TSh400 million (\$200,865), while a similarly well-located plot of just one-quarter of an acre could expect to fetch TSh250 million (\$125,540). Small plots (a quarter of an acre or less) farther from the tarmac road could be bought for TSh10–20 million (\$5,022–\$10,043). The demand for land in and around Salasala had transformed the city's former rural hinterland into desirable residential neighborhoods, despite the fact that they were mostly unplanned, informal settlements that lacked piped water and sanitation. Nevertheless, Salasala had become a highly sought-after place to build a house by the 2010s, especially among Dar es Salaam's middle classes.

These first two chapters examine how this transformation from rural hinterland to sought-after suburb took place from the end of the nineteenth century.

Inspired by James Brennan's appeal for accounts of urban Africa to pay attention to "the rents of the dead"—long-term patterns and processes of property creation, rentier activity, and accumulation—this study places the emergence of the contemporary suburban frontier at Salasala in a broader account of the dialectical sociospatial development of Dar es Salaam in which the making of property and social differentiation are deeply entwined.¹ The wider story begins in familiar territory among Africa's colonial capitals.² The colonial state's alienation of land and the legal bifurcation of urban and rural land, the hostility to Africans residing in urban areas, the policies and practices of urban racial segregation, and the neglect of urban housing and services for Africans resonate beyond Dar es Salaam, particularly in those cities that were established in the context of colonial rule.³ The initial reluctance of Belgian, British, French, German, and Portuguese colonial states and employers to provide African housing, and the partial reversal of this position from the 1940s in an attempt to stabilize and appease urban labor forces, have been documented in cities such as Abidjan, Accra, Dakar, Conakry, Kinshasa, Lusaka, Maputo, Mombasa, Nairobi, and Zanzibar.⁴ Various forms of colonial urban property—from European suburbs to housing estates to subsidized finance to workers' accommodations—laid down significant urban resources that transformed urban space and laid the groundwork for social differentiation.

In order to explore how this played out and the consequences for sociospatial differentiation in Dar es Salaam, this chapter examines the groundwork that established the coloniality of space and the middle classes in the city. I first discuss the legal frameworks and administrative practices that were developed to manage land and urban planning during the German and British colonial periods. Law and bureaucratic practice relating to land, urban and rural space, and housing provided the conditions in which the original suburban frontier—an exclusive, well-serviced enclave for Europeans—was initially constructed in Kinondoni at Oysterbay. By the end of the colonial period a handful of housing estates had been developed by the colonial state for an emerging class of educated, employed Africans in the north and west of the township, establishing those areas as the city's most aspirational residential neighborhoods. Chapter 2 examines how this small state-built suburban frontier grew after Independence, as first the new elite and then the middle classes scrambled for land and housing in Kinondoni. What marks out the Tanzanian urban experience as unique is the state's twin disavowal of both the city and the middle class during the socialist, and to some extent the postsocialist, periods. Yet, while the state oscillated between hostility and ambivalence towards the suburban frontier, many of its bureaucrats, officials, and employees were among those busily investing in suburban property: transforming land into a commodity, building houses, and

pushing the frontier outwards. They were constructing both the city and the middle classes.

MAKING COLONIAL SPACE: LAND

Lying twenty kilometers to the north of Dar es Salaam's city center, the area in which Salasala is located today constituted part of the city's rural hinterland until the 1970s. It is likely that Salasala originated among the slave- and wage-labor plantations established by the Shomvi around the end of the nineteenth century. This part of the Swahili coast between Bagamoyo and Dar es Salaam, the Mrima Coast, was settled between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries. The Mrima Coast was populated by indigenous Shaha and Shirazi, and by Shomvi, who were elite members of Swahili society of mixed African and Persian descent who dominated long-distance trade networks between the Swahili Coast, the hinterland, and the Indian Ocean.⁵ Throughout the nineteenth century a combination of the caravan trade and up-country famine brought large numbers of people to settle at the coast, particularly around Bagamoyo and other smaller coastal settlements such as Kunduchi and Dar es Salaam itself, then a small village known as Mzizima. These settlers, many of them from the Uluguru Mountains two hundred kilometers to the west, became known as a distinct ethnic group, the Zaramo. They farmed the land, replaced the Shaha as the indigenous peoples, and formed the largest ethnic group in what became the Dar es Salaam region.⁶ By the advent of the German colonial period in the mid-1880s, the rural hinterland of Dar es Salaam was known as *Uzaramo* (place of the Zaramo).

It is difficult to be precise about authority over land on this part of the Mrima Coast during this period. Glassman notes that there was "no Swahili concept of private land ownership."⁷ Land in the coastal settlements such as Pangani, Bagamoyo, and Kunduchi was generally under the control of local leaders (whether Shomvi or Shirazi, or Zaramo leaders known as *mapazi*), who had rights to lease, gift, or sell land to newcomers.⁸ Outside of the coastal settlements, Zaramo shifting cultivators occupied scattered farmsteads, where they grew cassava, grains, fruit, and vegetables interspersed by uncultivated bushland. Ownership of planted trees conferred use and inheritance rights on the descent group, and individuals could loan land to newcomers on a sharecropping basis.⁹ With the rise of Omani power centered on Zanzibar from the 1830s and the alienation of land for Zanzibari-Omani rice and coconut plantations, the existing systems of land use and authority came under strain. This perhaps explains why some Shomvi elites retreated a few kilometers inland to establish plantations at places like Salasala and Goba towards the end of the nineteenth century.¹⁰

The periods of German (1885–1916) and then British (1919–61) colonial rule brought sweeping changes to the organization and control of land across the territory. The German Imperial Decree on Land Matters of 1895 and its subsequent

clarifications and amendments established the basic principles of authority over land and land rights that underpin the coloniality of space in the present day: the alienation of land by the colonial state, the centralization of authority over land allocation and transfer in the state, the introduction of the concept of private property, and the bifurcation of land rights along racial and spatial lines.¹¹ Yet these powers were not absolute: as we shall see, despite German and British intentions to monopolize power over land, laws and rules were navigated or ignored by Dar es Salaam's residents as they bought, sold, built, sublet, and squatted in and around the township. These too are the hallmarks of the coloniality of space.

The Imperial Decree alienated all land in the territory by declaring it *Herrenlos Kronland* (unowned Crown land) vested in the German Empire. Land that could be proven to be held privately, customarily, or communally was exempted. A further circular in 1896 differentiated documented ownership claims that conveyed security of tenure from permissive rights of occupation as evidenced by cultivation.¹² The native population was granted permissive rights of occupation in accordance with native law and custom, yet these rights were never considered equivalent to the private property rights afforded to settlers.¹³ The bifurcation of land ownership was therefore racial and spatial. European and Indian settlers and planters claimed land in the towns and the most fertile agricultural areas as individuals with private property rights, but natives lacked the requisite documentary evidence to prove their property ownership, particularly in the towns.¹⁴ These processes intersected to dispossess the majority of the native population from the land they had occupied in urban spaces and to lay the groundwork for an urban-rural bifurcation of land rights that was consolidated during the British colonial period.

In Dar es Salaam township there were no recorded African property owners left by the turn of the twentieth century.¹⁵ The German colonial government negotiated purchases of Arab-, Indian-, and European-owned land; natives, on the other hand, could simply be compensated—or intimidated—and removed.¹⁶ The 1903 Land Registration Ordinance provided for the registration of natives' land in towns, but this had little effect on natives' landownership in practice. By the outbreak of the First World War the authorities in Dar es Salaam township had only dealt with registering the property of Europeans and Indians, and few Africans could produce the documents required by the German administrators to substantiate their land claims.¹⁷ Outside of the township along the coastal strip dominated by Zanzibari-Omani plantations, land acquisitions and transfers took on a frontier-like quality. Arab claims to their plantations established during the period of Zanzibari hegemony were recognized by the Germans. Colonial officials further alienated large tracts of land for German and Indian settlers' plantations.¹⁸ In Kunduchi, close to present-day Salasala, the German district officer owned a plantation of thirty square miles that stretched from Tegeta to Africana.¹⁹ Local populations also participated in this land market, taking advantage of loopholes in German land law through which it was possible to obtain title by prescription

(the principle on which established, long-term use of land begets continued use of that land).²⁰ This loophole enabled “land-hungry investors and savvy coastal leaders” to buy and sell land along the coastal strip.²¹ By the end of the German colonial period speculative practices, particularly outside of the township, and the dispossession of Africans of urban land were well underway.

MAKING COLONIAL SPACE: THE URBAN AND THE RURAL


The British colonial administration reaffirmed the alienation of land by the colonial state and the inferiority of Africans’ land rights that had been established during the German colonial period.²² The 1923 Land Ordinance declared all occupied and unoccupied land as public land under the control of the governor, save for preexisting freeholds. The German district officer’s plantation at Kunduchi, for example, was parceled out to Arab, Greek, and Indian investors.²³ The occupation of public land was permitted, according to the terms of Britain’s mandate,²⁴ via a granted statutory right of occupancy issued by the governor for up to ninety-nine years “for the use and common benefit, direct or indirect, of the natives.”²⁵ A 1928 amendment to the 1923 ordinance extended statutory recognition to native occupation of land under customary law, but this deemed right of occupancy remained inferior to both a granted right of occupancy and government control over public lands into the postcolonial period.²⁶

The racial and spatial bifurcation of land rights introduced by the German colonial administration paved the way for a dual system of land tenure that was fleshed out under British indirect rule. Indirect rule functioned as a form of decentralized despotism in which European settlers were governed by, and had rights as citizens enshrined in, imported European law, while native subjects were administered according to customary law overseen by a native authority.²⁷ The dual system rested on the racial and spatial assumptions that Europeans belonged in towns while Africans were members of territorialized rural tribes.²⁸ In the first two decades of British colonial rule in Tanganyika, Africans were not thought to be adaptable to urban areas and their permanent residence in towns was resisted by the colonial administration.²⁹ These assumptions were coded into British colonial land law and administrative practices, such that the British colonial state did not consider customary law applicable in townships.³⁰ Secure land tenure (a granted right of occupancy) was available in planned urban zones and on German-era freeholds, but in practice this excluded the majority of Africans from holding title to urban land as few could compete in the land market with Europeans and Indians.³¹ Africans were granted only deemed rights of occupancy under customary law outside of the township boundaries. Throughout the British colonial period officials argued against expanding freehold tenure to Africans on the basis that they would not make productive use of their land: they would sell it, or collateralize and lose

it, and end up drifting to the towns, becoming “detrribalized” and placing undue burdens on government.³²

This apparently neat bifurcation of land rights into native/rural/customary and nonnative/urban/statutory provided the parameters within which land could be legally occupied, but it could not fully contain the reality on the ground. This was most apparent in Dar es Salaam’s periurban and rural hinterland, which increasingly served to accommodate rural migrants and urban workers. From the turn of the century Dar es Salaam had been surrounded by Zaramo villages located beyond the (then) town boundary where migrants to the town settled: at Buguruni, Tabata, and Ubungo; the Sukuma villages at Msasani and Magogoni; the Nyamwezi settlements at Kinondoni and along the Msimbazi Valley; the Ngoni settlements at Keko and Kijitonyama; and the Sudanese settlements at Gerezani.³³ What were the land rights of those who had migrated from their up-country native territories where they held communal land rights but who now occupied land in the Uzaramo native authority? What were the land rights of natives residing in Dar es Salaam’s hinterland as their villages were swallowed up by the growing township? What were the land rights of those who bought or sold land outside of the township? These ambiguities, together with the tension between the recognition of customary land rights in law and their inferior status in practice, would become hallmarks of the coloniality of space, fomenting chronic ambiguity in land rights and tenure security that would last into the next century. This was nowhere more evident than in the hinterland of the expanding town and on the suburban frontier that developed there.

In tandem with colonial land law, colonial urban planning laid the groundwork for the development of the suburban frontier. Urban racial segregation by building type was introduced with two sets of *Bauordnung* (building regulations) in 1891 and 1914, and further developed by the British in 1924 when their plan for the town comprised three zones with different building and planning regulations that effectively segregated the town along racial lines (map 3). Zone One was reserved exclusively for European-style residential buildings and stretched from the harbor, through the government district to the well-laid-out suburban housing provided for Europeans along Sea View. In the 1930s Zone One was extended to the newly constructed European suburb of Oysterbay, where plot sizes permitted large houses and landscaped gardens and residents enjoyed flush toilets and surfaced roads. The construction of Sea View and, later, Oysterbay planted an exclusive suburban frontier on Dar es Salaam’s northern periphery—an oasis of space, services, and security of tenure amidst the official neglect and underinvestment in urban housing that characterized urban space for the rest of the township’s residents. Zone Two was for mixed residential and business use and corresponded with the growing commercial area to the west of the European zone dominated by the Indian community. Buildings in both Zones One and Two were to be constructed with permanent materials, which effectively excluded the majority



MAP 3. Zones I, II, and III in Dar es Salaam in the 1920s. Drawn by Mina Moshkeri 2023, based on 1925 map of Land, Survey and Mines Department, TNA 12589/I, in Brennan (2012). Reproduced with permission of Ohio University Press.

of Africans, who were relegated to Zone Three at the far west of the township where construction in local materials was permitted. The zones were somewhat porous—380 native huts still stood in Zones One and Two in 1931, and the city's central market was relocated to Kariakoo in 1923, bringing with it many Indian traders who subsequently built and rented property in Zone Three.³⁴ But over time property was increasingly made to fit the zones, for example by refusing permits to Africans to build or repair buildings in Zones One and Two, enabling the authorities to demolish native buildings on health and safety grounds as at Gerezani and Kisutu. The three zones became known by their Swahili names: *uzunguni* (place of the European), *uhindini* (place of the Indian), and *uswahilini* (place of the Swahili, in this context meaning "African").³⁵ Each of these became associated with a specific type of urban landscape in a relational hierarchy of urban space, as we shall see in chapter 4.

MAKING COLONIAL SPACE: HOUSING

Social differentiation among the African population during the colonial period was tied in part to the creation and control of urban property.³⁶ Much urban property—land and housing—was generated by those navigating or ignoring colonial legal frameworks. People squatted, sublet, built, and rented space in and around the township and profited in the process. Opportunities for accumulation also presented themselves via the colonial state's meager efforts to provide urban accommodation for Africans, as we shall see, but these were only accessible to a select few in employment during the British colonial period.

The reticence to permit Africans rights to urban space during the colonial period was as evident in the realm of housing as it was enshrined in land law and urban planning. Government housing provision during the British period was woefully inadequate, never even attempting to keep pace with the town's African population. This was partly due to official neglect—the Tanganyika government was low on the list of the British government's colonial priorities—but local officials were also reluctant to waste money on what they thought were temporary African town dwellers.³⁷ Yet the urban population, and demand for urban housing, continued to grow. Following the high population growth rates of the late nineteenth century, the town grew at a much slower rate after the First World War, from 24,600 in 1921 to 34,300 by 1931, reaching 45,100 by 1943. Thereafter the rate of population growth substantially increased with in-migration, such that the town's population reached 69,277 by 1948 and then 128,742 by 1957.³⁸ According to the 1931 population census the township's African population included domestic servants (2,873), casual laborers (2,425), dock workers (1,642), traders (583), cooks (566), those of "no occupation" (530), and clerks (454). The Public Works Department hired a daily average of two thousand laborers, and approximately

two thousand laborers worked on the sisal estates in the township's hinterland, including in and around Kunduchi and Salasala.³⁹

Limited government efforts to accommodate Africans in the town were initially focused on Zone Three. This consisted of Kariakoo from the 1900s and was extended to Ilala from the 1930s to accommodate Africans evicted from other parts of the township. A total of 2,084 building plots were laid out in Kariakoo and Ilala for Africans to lease and build their own housing. Until the 1940s, this was the extent of authorized urban land provided for African self-built houses in the township. Minimal services were available. By 1932 Ilala had sixteen hundred residents, one standpipe, one public toilet, and no waste collection, street lighting, or police patrol. In 1939, Africans—who constituted three-quarters of the township's population—paid £9,000 in taxes, yet only £4,331 was spent in Zone Three from a district budget of £18,235.⁴⁰

Conditions in the township also suffered as a result of the depression and the Second World War. In 1931, 40 percent of those usually in work in the town were unemployed,⁴¹ and by 1939, thirty thousand natives were living in three thousand huts with no access to authorized land on which to settle in the township.⁴² Matters in Zone Three were exacerbated by the high rents in Zone Two, which pushed many Indians to build or rent accommodation in Zone Three. Since Indians in Kariakoo tended to rent to other Indians who could afford to pay more for rooms, the overall effect was to limit available accommodation and push up rental prices for Africans in the native quarter of the town.⁴³ A colonial government report in 1942 found that 87 percent of African junior government employees could not afford to live on their wages. In-migration increased, there was a shortage of building materials, and rents doubled between 1943 and 1947.⁴⁴ The scarcity and cost of housing, along with the paucity of "starvation wages" and generally poor urban conditions, prompted three strikes between 1939 and 1947 led by the township's dockworkers,⁴⁵ the last of which escalated into a general strike that shut down the township for a week and spread up-country.⁴⁶

Forced to respond, the colonial government developed a limited "urban entitlement" for those it considered bona fide urban residents, graded according to official racial category, which included food and clothing rations, rent controls, and various housing initiatives.⁴⁷ Unauthorized urban dwellers, on the other hand, were to be removed. *Wahuni* (a term for "undesirables," referring to the un- and underemployed) were considered unproductive idlers who fomented disorder. Starting in the late 1930s, attempts to round up tax defaulters morphed into raids. Between March and December 1947, 904 "undesirable persons" were repatriated to their rural home areas; by 1954 this had risen to 2314. In 1957–58, over 2 percent of the population of the town was forcibly removed annually in an attempt to stem the tide of unemployed "drifters" coming to the town, and to clamp down on what the colonial government identified as law-and-order problems.⁴⁸

Despite these attempts, the colonial government began to accept that (some) Africans were indeed staying in the towns. As in other colonies, the Tanganyika government undertook to support the development of a small African middle class that would, it was hoped, become a settled urban workforce reproduced in stable nuclear families.⁴⁹ Housing was central to this goal. In fact, housing schemes for government workers had been proposed two decades previously by salaried Africans. As early as the 1920s, the Tanganyika Territory African Civil Servants Association (TTACSA) had lobbied the colonial government for preferential access to plots on which they could build, but at the time the authorities did not wish to appear to be favoring government workers.⁵⁰

While the government housing schemes of the 1940s and 1950s were pivotal to the emergence of a middle class, this episode demonstrates that an emerging class consciousness had earlier roots among the territory's mission- and government-schooled, English-speaking Africans who were employees in the colonial service, teachers, doctors, and traders.⁵¹ This was a relatively "new" social group compared to the existing Islamic coastal elite, being mostly Christian and coming from rural areas.⁵² It was also very small: in the late 1930s Africans in the colonial secretariat, for example, numbered 4 (out of 18), 2 in the Treasury (out of 39), and 14 in customs (out of 114).⁵³ TTACSA was formed in Tanga in 1922 and subsequently established branches in Dar es Salaam and Tukuyu; in the northwest the Bukoba Bahaya Union was formed in 1924.⁵⁴ The Tanga branch ran a library, a football team, and evening classes in English, geography, and history. Between 1925 and 1927 the Dar es Salaam branch had seventy members. They petitioned the colonial government for housing allowances, better salaries, and leave; Iliffe describes TTACSA's purpose as "a combination of mutual improvement and elite unity" for those who saw themselves as "the vanguard of civilisation" who needed to "earn enough to lead suitably respectable lives." In 1927 the Dar es Salaam branch of TTACSA demanded employment terms equal to those of Africans in colonial service in Kenya and Zanzibar but was met with "a curt reply" from the Colonial Office.⁵⁵

Leaders of TTACSA went on to become leaders in the African Association (AA), formed in Dar es Salaam in 1929 as the representative organization for Africans in the territory. The forerunner of the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), which pushed for independence, the politics of the AA was a mix of class concerns and African unity that struggled in the 1930s and 1940s to bring together an alliance of educated civil servants, traders, property owners, and urban notables.⁵⁶ In the early 1930s, for example, members of the AA in Dar es Salaam protested the colonial authority's ban on Africans' admission to certain films, but their objection was on behalf of AA members only, who they argued were more educated and civilized than most Africans. Similarly in the 1950s, educated Africans were writing to local newspapers to decry the lack of suitable, separate housing for educated,

“civilized” Africans, at a time when only 2 percent of the city’s African population could write in English and fewer were able to read English-language newspapers.⁵⁷ Government clerks did not want to mix with the uneducated and unpropertied, and certainly not with *wahuni*.⁵⁸ Colonial newspapers played a crucial role in shaping a “bourgeois culture” among this small group of employed Africans, creating space for discussion of what ideas such as “progress” and “civilization” might mean, and providing a means by which an emerging middle class could participate in a discourse of modernity that foregrounded self-help, associational life, and respectability.⁵⁹ Appropriate housing, necessary for living “respectable lives,” was a constant concern for this small but emerging group of educated urban employees.

By the 1940s the colonial government effectively agreed with them. They now saw the incubation of an urban middle class—most of whom were government workers—as crucial to maintaining consent to colonial rule and to containing the “radical potential” of the urban masses.⁶⁰ However, colonial policy on class formation among urban Africans in Tanganyika pulled in different directions, denying an independent African bourgeoisie an economic base on which it could build itself while simultaneously providing access to a government-controlled asset—a limited amount of relatively high-quality housing—as the basis for the formation of a middle class dependent on the colonial state.

The passing of the Colonial Development and Welfare Act (1940) in Britain provided access to much-needed funding for a more coherent approach to urban development. The colonial government set out the first town and country planning legislation, gave Dar es Salaam municipal status, earmarked public funds for urban infrastructure, and set out various urban planning schemes in which plots would be demarcated for self-construction.⁶¹ The 1950 Ten-Year Development Plan for Tanganyika, with a budget of £24.5 million,⁶² set aside £1.2 million for African housing and £3 million for European housing. Despite colonial anxieties about the political implications of poor-quality African urban housing conditions, the racial hierarchy of urban entitlement was nevertheless evident in the different resources made available for housing: £1,500–3,000 per house for Europeans, £1,000 per house for Asians, and £216 per house for Africans.⁶³ Between 1946 and 1950, the colonial government constructed 261 two-room houses for rent to Africans at Ilala and 242 houses at Temeke (map 4), and a further 3,000 plots were demarcated there by 1960. During the 1950s there were further houses (450) and plots (3,107) demarcated at Magomeni, 700 plots provided at Kinondoni and 1,000 plots demarcated in Kigamboni.

These initiatives were paltry compared to the housing needs in the township, but they were explicitly aimed at nurturing an African middle class.⁶⁴ The Temeke housing scheme, for example, was only available to Africans earning top salaries.⁶⁵ In the Magomeni scheme government clerks, the wealthiest group of Africans, were the largest group of allottees; in addition, 30 percent of the house builders in the scheme already owned another house.⁶⁶ Financing for house-building was



MAP 4. J. A. K. Leslie's map of Dar es Salaam township in the late 1950s (East African Institute of Social Research 1963).

made available to those with sufficient funds. A deposit of £75 unlocked a £500 house-building loan from the government's African Urban Housing Loan Fund, which after a slow start in 1953 was oversubscribed by 1960.⁶⁷ In both rental and self-build schemes, only Africans who were employed on the highest salaries could access colonial housing. By planting small oases of valuable property amidst the township's poor-quality housing stock, the colonial authorities laid the groundwork for both class differentiation and the next wave of the suburban frontier. As we shall see, after independence, Africans in top government roles continued to use their position to gain access to sought-after government urban property schemes, breathing life into the suburban frontier as they did so.

It was not only government-built enclaves that generated opportunities in the housing sector. The African response to Dar es Salaam's housing problem came from an emerging class of enterprising landlords. Many of the buildings constructed in Zone Three and beyond were Swahili houses built for residential and rental use. The Swahili house was relatively cheap to build and was constructed from mangrove-pole frames, mud walls, and palm-frond roofs. It was built around a central corridor that provided direct access to single rooms that could be rented out individually. The corridor was entered from an open veranda at the front, where people could sit or sell charcoal and firewood, and led to a private courtyard at the back that provided communal space for latrines, cooking, and washing clothes. The architectural style proved popular as the house could be extended over time as resources allowed; tenants could also be accommodated without much disturbance to the owners (many of whom lived in the house themselves). In 1939 there were roughly three thousand African homeowners in Dar es Salaam (about 20 percent of the town's African population) who had constructed Swahili houses for rental. Women were among them, having invested profits from beer-brewing and prostitution into property: by 1952 women constituted 20 percent of all taxpaying African homeowners.⁶⁸ By the time of his 1956 survey of Dar es Salaam, J. A. K. Leslie noted that the township contained over twelve thousand African-owned houses and over eight thousand landlords, and that three-quarters of the town's population were tenants. He estimated that landlords could make up to 25 percent profit on rents.⁶⁹ African homeowners constituted "the core of urban capitalists . . . and they formed the middle stratum of the African population."⁷⁰

Much of this property was not formally recognized by the colonial government. The lack of authorized space on which to build in the township meant that many Africans had no choice other than to build in what were referred to by the colonial authorities as "unplanned" locations, mostly agricultural villages inside or just beyond the township boundary. According to the Township Rules of 1923, residential construction within the township was only permitted within the requisite zone and on receipt of a permit from the colonial authorities. Since there was insufficient space in locations zoned for Africans' residential use (Zone Three), many simply squatted, occupying land without permission in places such as Buguruni,

Chang'ombe, Gerezani, Keko, Kigogo, Kinondoni, Magomeni, Mikoroshoni, Msa-sani, Segerea, and Temeke. In one of the clearest instances of the coloniality of space in the contemporary city, all of these places have become popular neighborhoods in which a large proportion of residents still lack secure title.⁷¹ Whether the construction of unauthorized buildings warranted tolerance or removal depended on their proximity to government or European property. At Gerezani, for example, 132 native homes that had been constructed close to European railway employees' housing were removed in 1929. Of those 132 homes, 37 were compensated at a very low rate, on the basis that they were the only "huts" that had been constructed before the passing of the 1923 Township Rules. However, the construction by Africans of a similar number of buildings at Keko, close to the docks but further away from nonnative buildings, was undisturbed. Unplanned settlements continued to grow during the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s, outpacing the colonial government's capacity to respond. By 1960 the Land Office estimated there were 5,000 homes built in such areas.⁷²

Those who could neither build, find, nor afford a room in the township settled outside of its boundaries. Dar es Salaam township's rural hinterland was a thinly populated patchwork of plantations, villages, farms, and bush, but it offered opportunities for renters and landlords beyond the authorities' capacity for oversight. Despite the fact that this was Uzaramo territory, where land was supposed to be governed by communal use and customary law, in practice there was intense speculation and frontier-like activity, as had been the case during the German colonial period. Land was bought, sold, rented, and squatted. Land was purchased by "nonnatives," sold to them by Africans and Arabs who themselves were able to navigate loopholes in colonial land law in order to sell ostensibly communal lands to which they claimed long-standing ownership; and Africans squatted on landlords' coconut plantations, paying rent and guarding trees in exchange for residence and cultivation rights.⁷³ Some even sublet or hired laborers themselves.

SOCIALISM AND SOCIAL CLASS IN THE POSTCOLONIAL CITY

During the 1960s and 1970s the independent government grappled with the contradictions of urban development. After independence in 1961 and the Arusha Declaration in 1967, the political instincts of the government towards redressing the spatial distortions of colonialism rubbed up against the interests of the "bureaucratic bourgeoisie" and an emerging middle class, many of whom lived in Dar es Salaam.⁷⁴ These were social classes in formation, and their contours were neither clearly demarcated nor fixed.

In terms of land there was much continuity with the colonial period. The Tanzanian government maintained existing British land laws.⁷⁵ All occupied and unoccupied land became public land under the control of the president.⁷⁶ Freehold titles were abolished:⁷⁷ existing (German-era) titles were converted to government

leases in 1963, and then to granted rights of occupancy in 1969. The effective nationalization of land streamlined the land tenure system, in which rights of occupancy were either directly granted or deemed granted in the case of customary tenure. Private individual ownership of land, its purchase, sale, or rent was prohibited. In urban areas the government had the sole right to alienate public land, for example by declaring a planning area, and to allocate plots to individuals with a granted right of occupancy for thirty-three or ninety-nine years. It was assumed—by land administrators, following their colonial forebears—that customary rights did not exist in urban areas because land in towns could only be legally acquired with a granted right of occupancy.⁷⁸ Since urban land was public land, those not in possession of a granted right of occupancy could be dispossessed of their land. They were entitled to compensation for “unexhausted improvements” only (buildings, trees), since the land itself had no value.

The party of the independence struggle, TANU, consolidated its control of the state under the leadership of President Julius Nyerere, and in 1976 it merged with the Zanzibari Afro-Shirazi Party to become the *Chama Cha Mapinduzi* (CCM; Party of the Revolution). Between 1962 and 1965 the country became a one-party state, party organs were established from the National Executive Committee down to the *balozi* (ten-household cell), the army and trade unions were brought into the party structure, native authorities were abolished, and civil servants and police were required to join the party.⁷⁹ State control of the economy was extended over the second half of the 1960s and 1970s as Tanzania turned to socialism. This included the disbanding of the cooperatives and the formation of state trading companies and marketing boards, the establishment of industrial parastatals, and, with the Arusha Declaration in 1967, the nationalization of foreign enterprise, including financial institutions. The leadership of these institutions—ministers, politicians, the civil service, the judiciary, the military, and the parastatals—formed a ruling class or “bureaucratic bourgeoisie” that wrested control of the economy from the “commercial bourgeoisie” that had formed during the colonial period, although the assets of those connected to the party mostly remained intact.⁸⁰ The central contradiction of Tanzanian socialism lay in the fact that it was the bureaucratic bourgeoisie who took control of the economy in their own interests, rather than in the interests of workers and peasants.⁸¹ As we shall see, they also created and then monopolized urban residential property on Dar es Salaam’s suburban frontier, finally attaining the desired respectability and separation from the rest of the city’s residents.

Between the bureaucratic bourgeoisie and the workers and peasants, an interstitial group began to take shape during the 1960s and 1970s. The expansion of the civil service and industrial production created opportunities for those who had completed secondary education, including in skilled factory work and lower-level civil service jobs such as agricultural extension workers, teachers, and technicians. The civil service alone expanded rapidly during the 1970s at about 11 percent a year.⁸² Many of those who moved to take advantage of opportunities in the city

in the 1960s had completed secondary education up-country. This emerging middle class enjoyed state employment, rising salaries and promotion opportunities, access to public housing and government health facilities, affordable consumer goods, and subsidized food staples.⁸³ They also enjoyed new modern leisure facilities such as the city's drive-in cinema, one of only a handful on the continent, which opened in 1966.⁸⁴ Hugely popular, the drive-in epitomized the promise of socialist modernity in an independent Tanzania and provided the emerging middle classes in the city with Sunday afternoon leisure entertainment. It was a mostly middle-class pursuit, since most patrons had cars (although it was also possible to catch the film from outside). In 1963, half of mid-grade civil servants in Dar es Salaam owned cars, supported by state-financed loans.⁸⁵ Yet the drive-in—or more specifically the cars in which patrons sat—also symbolized the contradictory position of the middle classes in the 1960s: on the one hand their lifestyles proved that Tanzanians could now enjoy the fruits of independence, while on the other their conspicuous consumption was seen to come at the cost of national development. Nyerere himself railed against wasteful expenditure on imported vehicles by government workers, and particularly by graduates “whose education had been financed by revenue raised from the sweat of peasants.”⁸⁶ Better to buy a bicycle, or to walk.⁸⁷ Yet there was a difference between the elite—exemplified by the minister who ordered seventeen Mercedes Benzes for regional commissioners “despite being told not to,”⁸⁸ and most government employees who were importing cheaper, used vehicles.⁸⁹ At the same time, workers who were waiting for unreliable state-owned buses or who had to walk to work could see their bosses driving cars.⁹⁰

The emerging middle classes occupied an uneasy position in political ideology and national culture as espoused by President Nyerere and TANU. Nyerere's *ujamaa* philosophy of socialism was to be built on national self-reliance and rural communal production, the latter to be achieved in a countryside reorganized around collective villages. This would require hard work and sacrifice from all citizens in the pursuit of national development.⁹¹ After the relative buoyancy of Dar es Salaam's economy in the 1960s, the 1967 Arusha Declaration signaled a political, economic, and cultural turn away from the cities and from Dar es Salaam—the colonial capital—in particular. According to TANU's socialist ideology, cities contained the highest concentration of exploitative activity and benefited from services provided at rural peasants' expense.⁹² They were a drag on national progress. In government-owned newspapers, radio broadcasts, and in political speeches, the decadent, unproductive, and immoral city-dweller became the foil for the frugal and hard-working rural peasant who symbolized national citizenship and development.⁹³ Nationalist discourse approved of the *wananchi* (citizens) as long as they were productive *wakulima* (farmers) or *wafanyakazi* (workers). *Wanyonyaji* (exploiters) and *wahuni* (the urban un- and underemployed), on the other hand, were cast as threats to the project of nation-building, being idlers, loiterers, or both. Of particular concern were the urban exploiters or *makupe* (ticks), the

bwanyenye (bourgeoisie), and the *makabaila* (landlords), many of whom owned property in Dar es Salaam.⁹⁴ In popular discourse these tensions were captured in the figures of the *kabwela*, the poor urbanite who was exploited and oppressed by the *naizisheni* or *naizi*, the privileged city dweller, usually a civil servant, landlord, shopkeeper, or employer, who lived off the hard work of others and who had prospered from nationalization without qualifications or effort.⁹⁵ *Wanyonyaji*, *makabaila*, and *wahuni* were urban caricatures who lived off unearned urban rents or unproductive street hawking while failing to add value to the national economy.⁹⁶

Nyerere sought to tackle urban landlordism and conspicuous consumption among government officials with the Leadership Code, the most controversial element of the Arusha Declaration, at least within the party.⁹⁷ It forbade government officials and their spouses from “capitalist activities” including landlordism, owning shares, directing companies, or receiving more than one salary.⁹⁸ Then in 1971 the government passed the Acquisition of Buildings Act, which nationalized all buildings worth more than TSh100,000. They were given to the National Housing Corporation to rent out, though few Africans ended up renting these properties: some ended up in the control of well-placed civil servants and politicians.⁹⁹ The Acquisition of Buildings Act and rent restriction legislation were partly driven by an attempt to protect Tanzanians from exploitative landlords. In addition, the Acquisition of Buildings Act was also an attempt to intervene in the property market on behalf of urban Africans, effectively nationalizing many Indian-built constructions in *uhindini*.¹⁰⁰ Yet none of these interventions struck a decisive blow against urban landlords, and although the Leadership Code made profiting from residential property more difficult, it did not entirely stop government officials, or others connected to the Party, from so doing.

Against this backdrop, the middle classes found ways to justify their presence in Dar es Salaam—they were part of the educated, productive group showing others the way to national development.¹⁰¹ They were respectable, morally upstanding citizens who deserved their position in the city as a result of their education, discipline, and hard work. They had foils of their own: they were not among the city’s *wahuni*, prostitutes, or sexual predators; their personal comportment and their domestic arrangements were modest and respectable; and they refrained from conspicuous consumption.¹⁰² They were also not the elite, who used their positions to capture high-value residential property in the postcolonial period.

THE COLONIALITY OF SPACE—ELITE CAPTURE OF THE SUBURBAN FRONTIER

Despite the government’s efforts to prevent class differentiation in the 1960s and 1970s, an elite group dominated by senior government employees, politicians, and party and military officials nevertheless managed to prosper in the postcolonial period, not least through their acquisition of the most secure residential property in the best locations in Dar es Salaam. In the years leading up to and following

independence, Tanganyika's governing elite availed themselves of the newfound opportunities to acquire residential property in and around the former European enclave areas of the city, most of it in the city's northern suburbs. They effectively set in motion a scramble for the suburban frontier. As early as 1959, senior civil servants and ministers moved into properties or were allocated plots for construction in the European suburbs of Oysterbay and Msasani Village.¹⁰³ In Zanzibar a similar process took place after the 1964 revolution, where "one of the Revolutionary Council's first official acts was the acquisition of the 'eight ministerial houses at Mazizini', the beachfront villas of the upper crust of colonial officers."¹⁰⁴

As Africanization of the civil service gathered pace, the state both created urban residential property and supplied the financial means for employees to access it. In the early 1960s a Revolving Loan Fund was set up to enable senior officials to purchase plots and build houses in Kinondoni's inner and outer suburbs of Upanga, Kurasini, and Magomeni. The fund lent TSh16.3 million to 230 borrowers between 1963 and 1968.¹⁰⁵ At Magomeni, plots in the low-density area were distributed to ministers, high-ranking civil servants, and politicians.¹⁰⁶ The small number of housing initiatives that were undertaken reinforced unequal access to property rather than responding to the urgent housing needs of Dar es Salaam's growing population. The National Housing Corporation (NHC), founded in 1962, pursued a number of initiatives in its first decade, including slum clearance and the construction of new homes, but suffered from a lack of funding and was abandoned by central government a decade later, having built just 8,209 housing units in the city, most of which were sold or rented to civil servants.¹⁰⁷ Between 1970 and 1973 alone the NHC's Dar es Salaam office received 5,500 housing applications.¹⁰⁸ Other initiatives aimed at easing the housing supply problem for urban employees included the launch in 1973 of the Tanzania Housing Bank. Despite its mandate to provide financing for low-cost housing, its loans were nevertheless captured by the better-off.¹⁰⁹ In the mid-1970s the bank was dispensing loans averaging TSh32,300, three times the cost of building a six-room Swahili house.¹¹⁰

The 1970s World Bank-sponsored Sites and Services schemes in Kinondoni consolidated the suburban frontier as a zone of promise and speculation for those with resources. Located in the then periurban areas of Kijitonyama, Sinza, and Mikocheni, all three sites were close to the Bagamoyo Road and the former European residential suburbs. Although Sites and Services schemes were supposed to provide serviced plots on which the poor could complete their own construction, they became much more mixed areas in the 1980s as original allottees transferred land to better-off households and others maneuvered to have "creations" (additional plots) added to the neighborhoods.¹¹¹ In 1980 only 15 percent of the plots had completed houses on them, while 29 percent of plots were empty, suggesting a high degree of speculation.¹¹² In Mikocheni, high-ranking government officials were conspicuously overrepresented among the plot allottees, as they had been previously in the allocation of low-density plots in Magomeni. Following the World Bank's withdrawal of support from further Sites and Services schemes

in Tanzania, the government went ahead with its own large-scale urban planning scheme in Mbezi in the late 1970s and further Sites and Services schemes in Tegeta and Tabata in the early 1980s. These schemes unleashed a frenzy of speculative activity—at a time when the Leadership Code was in place—as well-placed bureaucrats scrambled to secure plot allocations for themselves or others in their social network. Investigating the allocation of plots in Mbezi, Joseph Kironde found a maze of double allocations, random changes to plot numbers, “creations,” and instructions from highly ranked civil servants, including the principal secretary in the Ministry of Lands, for plots to be allocated to particular individuals.¹¹³ Similarly, although the Tegeta and Tabata Sites and Services schemes were planned to provide resettlement sites for residents of inner-city areas slated for demolition, plenty of plots were allocated to civil servants and politicians in those schemes as well.

With these new oases of state-planned urban land in Kinondoni, the new suburban frontier began to take shape, offering security of tenure in areas laid out by government in formal planning schemes. By the 1970s and early 1980s an emerging middle class made up of mid-grade civil servants had joined the elite on the expanding suburban frontier. If they had the right connections they could live in a good location in a rented NHC flat, use their networks to access a plot in a planning scheme, and access a loan to build a house, which could then be rented out. The particularly savvy sublet all or part of their NHC flat. The NHC was reluctant to evict such tenants as they were important in the party structure.¹¹⁴

The majority of people living in Dar es Salaam, however, did not have access to planned plots in desirable locations with security of tenure in the form of a granted right of occupancy. This did not only apply to the urban poor: plenty of employees failed to obtain housing on the suburban frontier.¹¹⁵ In 1975, a third of the ninety thousand residents of Manzese, one of the city’s largest unplanned neighborhoods, had full-time jobs, including in manufacturing and the civil service.¹¹⁶ The long-standing problem of the supply of surveyed land zoned for residential use continued. In 1972 the Lands Division provided 6,331 planned plots across the country at a time when the waiting list for high-density plots in Dar es Salaam alone was 15,000.¹¹⁷ But the problem was also a bureaucratic one. There was an “implicit class bias” in the planning and administration of urban space that valued bureaucratic procedure and technical expertise above the interests of the urban poor.¹¹⁸ In other words, government officials did not simply use their positions and their networks to gain control of prime residential land in the city for their own benefit, but they also did little to help those who found the procedure difficult to navigate and who lacked the right connections. Pursuing a formal plot was, in the words of one observer:

a tedious procedure which an applicant has to forbear with patience and more often than not expense; if the frustration of waiting for long hours in unfriendly office corridors is to be ignored. Expenses on the part of the applicant due to this tedious

procedure can be more in the form of the numerous fares in the course of chasing the elusive Certificate of Occupancy or in attempts by applicants to get moving a certificate which for some unaccountable reason has decided to 'sit' in one of the offices for an unnecessarily long time. We can note here that it is those from the middle and upper strata of the petty-bourgeoisie who are best suited to bureaucratic wrangles in contrast with the workers who may be exasperated and overwhelmed or even repulsed by officious obstructionism.¹¹⁹

In the early 1970s the fees to acquire a planned plot added up to almost two months' average salary.¹²⁰ An application could take up to 280 days, assuming the application went smoothly. In fact it often took much longer, with applications for a plot having to wait months or years for a plot allocation committee to convene, before even starting the application for a right of occupancy for that plot. The procedure also assumed that the various officials spread across the understaffed departments involved in the administration of urban land (lands, surveys, valuation, town planning) interacted efficiently with one another. Breakdowns in the procedure were all too common, and yet the procedure had to be followed unless one knew how to successfully navigate the bureaucracy. As Richard Stren noted, "The aggressive, well-educated and better paid urban dweller will be much more capable of getting a plot for himself than low-income, rural migrants."¹²¹ The belief in technocratic expertise was central to the class culture of high-ranking government officials, and it ensured that those lacking the requisite combination of money, experience, and connections were excluded from accessing prime planned land on the suburban frontier.

THE COLONIALITY OF SPACE—SQUATTING


The class bias of urban officials was also in evidence in the regular purges of *wahuni*, who were un- or underemployed in the city. These roundups and repatriations were a continuation of the colonial practice and were decried by those who saw the persecution of the urban poor as contradictory to socialism.¹²² Their removal was officially justified on the grounds that they were being unproductive in the city. Yet their unruly presence in the city also unnerved the urban propertied classes who had invested in the idea of the modern, ordered city, in which the "growth of shanties and proliferation of itinerant traders were a blot on the landscape."¹²³

The independent government found itself having to deal with unplanned, informal settlements early on. Land in unplanned settlements was not gazetted, surveyed, demarcated, or issued with granted rights of occupancy. As early as 1962 local planning officials advocated measures to discourage unplanned land acquisition and development. They complained of squatters in Magomeni, Buguruni, and Temeke and worried that new plans to give out building numbers in order to facilitate the collection of property tax would condone such buildings, making it

impossible to demolish them at some point in the future. Yet the Dar es Salaam City Council and its Land Department, as well as the central government, provided neither the resources nor the political will to actually remove squatters.¹²⁴ The removal of squatters exacted compensation (for trees and “unexhausted improvements” such as buildings), which made the acquisition of land for planning purposes expensive. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the only squatter removals that took place were at Makaburini, Keko Juu, and Temeke South in 1967, Mwananyamala in 1968, and at Buguruni and Kisutu in 1975. These squatter settlements were, as Kironde notes, the “tip of the iceberg,” and unplanned settlements continued to develop apace.¹²⁵ The 5,000 “squatter houses” recorded in Dar es Salaam in 1960 grew to 7,000 by 1963, 27,981 in 1972, and 43,501 in 1979, by which time these areas were housing 60 percent of the city’s population.¹²⁶ By the late 1980s unplanned settlements had fanned out across the city and stretched up to twenty-five kilometers along the main road arteries into the city’s northern periurban and rural edges around Tegeta, Kimara, Ukonga, and Mbagala (map 5).

After the relative gains following independence in 1961, making a life in the city became increasingly hard in the 1970s, as Dar es Salaam was beset by a deteriorating economy and an urban administration in crisis. The expanded postindependence state apparatus struggled to manage the economy. Crop authorities and parastatals failed to boost agricultural and industrial production, there was prolonged nationwide drought in 1973–74, the trade balance went into deficit, there was a chronic shortage of foreign exchange and imports, and the country became increasingly reliant on foreign aid.¹²⁷ Agricultural production was disrupted by villagization, which became compulsory in 1973.¹²⁸ By 1977 about 70 percent of the rural population had been moved to communal villages.¹²⁹ These problems were compounded by the breakup of the East African Community in 1977, the OPEC oil price rises, deteriorating terms of trade, and the war with Idi Amin’s Uganda in 1978–79. GDP growth fell from 2.1 percent in 1979–81 to 0.6 percent in 1982–84.¹³⁰

The macroeconomic situation had a devastating effect on households. The nationalization of industries and financial services and the rise of parastatals meant that, in 1976, the government was responsible for 65 percent of waged employment and 70 percent of the wage bill. Between 1974 and 1988 real wages fell by 83 percent.¹³¹ In Dar es Salaam, there were shortages of food and household items, including staple grains, soap, and cooking oil. Queueing became a standard part of everyday life. By 1980 low-income families were spending 85 percent of their household budget on food (up from 56 percent in 1965), and even high-income families were spending 40 percent (up from 31 percent in 1963).¹³² The maize subsidy, which had been in place since 1974 to compensate for declining real wages, was scrapped in 1984.¹³³ Parastatals were apportioned farmland and urban workers were encouraged to take up farming in the city’s periurban fringes as part of the government’s *Kilimo cha Kufa na Kuona* (“Farming for survival”) campaign, which was to have long-lasting implications for Dar es Salaam’s hinterland, as we shall see in chapters 2 and 3.



MAP 5. Dar es Salaam City and Region boundaries, and major squatter areas, 1984. Drawn by Mina Moshkeri 2023, based on Kironde (1994).

Compounding these problems was the decentralization policy of 1972, which abolished local governments. The Dar es Salaam City Council was dissolved in 1974. The city was divided into three districts (Ilala, Kinondoni, and Temeke) and managed directly by central government through the Dar es Salaam Regional Authority. With the government's focus on rural development, urban services declined and urban planning was neglected.¹³⁴ The passing of authority to central government made it very difficult to decentralize powers back to local governments when they were reinstated in 1978. This was particularly so in the case of land. Given the evident benefits of being able to control land allocation and use,¹³⁵ a long-standing struggle over the control of urban land emerged between the Ministry of Lands and the reinstated Dar es Salaam City Council. This exacerbated problems in the administration of urban land, as was seen in the allocation of plots in the Mbezi Planning Scheme.

The coloniality of space was writ large on the landscape as the city continued to grow. Between 1967 and 1978 the city's population almost tripled to 769,445,¹³⁶ but urban land delivery and housing could not keep pace. City master plans were approved in 1968 and 1979 but without the resources to implement them. The bureaucratic bourgeoisie had staked out their claim to the emerging suburban frontier through their manipulation of planning schemes in Kijitonyama, Sinza, Mikocheni, Tegeta, and Tabata. They also embarked on what Kironde drily calls "the struggle for Dar es Salaam's coastline" between the former European suburb at Oysterbay and Mbweni at the city's northernmost edge.¹³⁷ The vast majority of the city's dwellers had little choice other than to access land in unplanned settlements on which to build a house through purchase, inheritance, occupation, or allocation by local leaders. A process of in-filling and spreading out began, in which the various late colonial and postcolonial planning schemes were gradually surrounded by unplanned settlements. They were mostly tolerated by the government because it would have been politically difficult to evict the majority of urban dwellers from their homes. There was also little alternative. In the 1978 Dar es Salaam Master Plan all areas that had been squatted on were subsequently zoned for residential use.¹³⁸

. . .

The emergence of the middle class in Tanzania was both an intended and an unintended consequence of the colonial and then the postcolonial government's approaches to urban property. Initially anticipated to stabilize the colonial urban labor force and nurture respectable nuclear family households, the colonial state's belated investments in urban housing for employed Africans provided coveted economic and cultural assets for an emerging elite who also availed themselves of the colonizer's space on the eve of independence. The postcolonial state inherited a divided city in which sociospatial differentiation had already been etched into the landscape. The launching of the Arusha Declaration in 1967 heralded the country's

turn to socialism and a reorientation towards rural development and collective villages. The turn away from the towns was particularly marked in the case of Dar es Salaam, which was stripped of its status as capital city in 1973 in favor of Dodoma.¹³⁹ Yet many politicians and high-ranking civil servants continued to invest in their daily lives in Dar es Salaam, where they made use of their positions and networks to gain control of urban property. Below them an emerging class of urban wage-earners, many of whom were in government employment, joined the search for an urban plot that matched their employment status.

The coloniality of space does not only refer to the frameworks of colonial law and the remnants of colonial administrative practice pertaining to land rights and the management of space that lingered on after colonialism into the socialist period. They provided the framework, but as we have seen they did not fully contain the city and its inhabitants. Colonial and postcolonial land law and administration provided the racial, then class-based ideologies that shaped urban administrators' attitudes to how land should be used, by whom, and for what. These were increasingly shared by Tanzania's elite and the small middle class who had been able to mobilize their networks and know-how to establish themselves on the most valuable urban land. But the coloniality of space also provided opportunities for people to get by or to prosper by finding "unplanned" space to rent or to build on, or to substitute income by renting rooms, subletting, or farming at the city's edges. Over the next two decades, the growth of the city would continue to exceed the colonial bifurcation of space between urban and rural as more people looked to the suburban frontier as a place to make a life in the city.